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Abstract 
            This thesis is a collection of three essays on the economic consequences of a 
number of primarily non-market institutions, more precisely visual artists’ compensation 
scheme, religiosity and social influence. Methodology varies across the different chapters 
of this thesis: I use experimental, empirical and theoretical tools. In its contents this thesis 
contributes to the growing efforts made by scholars and researchers to build a bridge 
among social science disciplines, mainly psychology, sociology and law with economics. 
            In my first essay I model a work of art as a lottery in order to compare the two 
dominant compensation schemes for visual artists (painters and sculptures): with or 
without resale royalty. After the analysis of the experimental data I find that, in 
accordance with my conjecture, a number of behavioural biases in decision under 
uncertainty are present in resale royalty regime.  I conclude that resale royalty influences 
not only production and selling decisions of artists but also their welfare.  
            In the second paper using the Ethnic Diversity Survey, I examine how religious 
belief and practice relate to earnings in Canada. I consider the impact of the degree of 
religiosity using a composite score-based variable constructed by means of several 
questions in the survey. I also examine cross-religion differential in earnings and human 
capital return. I find that Jews enjoy a premium and Muslims’ earnings are significantly 
lower compared to the average. I find that the lower return to experience of Muslims 
explains a large portion of their earnings gap and it is caused by the immigrant status of 
their great majority. 
            My third essay proposes a modified version for the replicator equation. The 
replicator equation, originally conceived in evolutionary biology, is routinely used for 
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modelling the evolution of preferences and social norms, conceived through population 
proportions of types. My proposed version incorporates the components of social 
influence into the equation not only making the justification for its use in economics more 
solid but also it helps providing an explanation for some observed socioeconomic patterns 
that could not be otherwise explained. 
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Résumé 
            Cette thèse est une collection de trois essais portant sur les conséquences 
économiques de certains comportements hors marché, plus précisément la compensation 
des artistes en arts plastiques, l’effet de la a religiosité sur le salaire au Canada, ainsi que 
l’influence sociale. J’utilise diverses méthodologies dans cette thèse : expérimentation 
économique; analyse empirique ainsi que des outils  théoriques. Le leitmotiv de cette 
thèse est, donc, de construire un pont entre les sciences économiques et les autres 
disciplines telles la psychologie, sociologie et droit. 
            Dans mon premier essai je modélise les œuvres d’art plastique comme étant des 
loteries pour comparer les deux régimes dominants de la compensation des artistes, avec 
et sans droit de suite, à l’aide d’une expérience. En analysant les données générées par 
l’expérience, je trouve que des biais comportementaux dans la  décision sous l’incertitude 
sont exacerbés par le droit de suite. Je conclue que le droit de suite peut influencer les 
décisions des artistes sur la production et la vente des œuvres d’art mais aussi leur bien-
être. 
            Dans mon deuxième essai j’emploi les données de l’enquête sur la diversité 
ethnique canadienne dans une étude sur la relation entre les religions, la religiosité et le 
marché de travail.  Je construis un index de religiosité en utilisant trois questions de 
l’enquête. Je compare également les différents groupes religieux au Canada en matière de 
salaire horaire et retours au capital humain; trouvant ainsi que le salaire horaire supérieure 
à la moyenne des juifs s’explique par un retour sur expérience plus élevé. Je trouve un 
décalage de salaire horaire dans le sens opposé pour les musulmans qui semble être causé 
par le statut d’immigrant de leur plus grande majorité.  
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            Mon troisième article propose une version modifiée de l’équation de replicateur 
qui est régulièrement utilisée dans les études d’évolution des préférences et des  normes 
sociales.  Cette version proposée intègre dans l’équation des forces qui sont suggérées 
d’être derrière l’influence sociale. J’examine ensuite  cette version de l’équation pour en 
tirer des conséquences qualitatives. Je démontre que ma proposition peut fournir une 
explication pour certaines observations socioéconomiques, inexplicables auparavant. 
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Introduction    
            This thesis is a collection of three essays on the economic consequences of a 
number of primarily non-market institutions. In its contents this thesis contributes to the 
interdisciplinary researches aimed at using economic insights and methodology in 
understanding other social institutions studied more frequently in other social science 
disciplines. 
            My first essay examines the economic consequences of visual artists’ 
compensation schemes as stipulated in different legal systems (coauthored with Professor 
Jim Engle-Warnick). There are many situations in which a seller retains a portion of the 
property he or she sells.  One such institution is called “droit de suite”, or “resale 
royalty”, in which a visual artist receives a royalty payment every time his or her work of 
art is resold.  We model a work of art as a lottery, and experimentally study the effect on 
willingness to accept when a seller retains a small portion of the lottery. We find that 
lotteries with small probabilities of high outcomes are overvalued by the seller compared 
with other lotteries. We conclude that resale royalty may influence production and selling 
decisions of artists. 
            Using the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), I examine how religious belief and 
practice relate to earnings in Canada. I consider the impact of the degree of religiosity 
using a composite score-based variable constructed by means of several questions in the 
survey. I use this index as an explanatory variable in the estimation of standard human 
capital-earnings function. A negative correlation between religiosity and earnings is 
found controlling for demographic, behavioural and human capital variables. Examining 
the cross-religion differential in earnings and human capital return, I find that Jews enjoy 
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a premium and Muslims’ earnings are significantly lower compared to the average. I find 
that the lower return to experience of Muslims explains a large portion of their earnings 
gap and it is caused by the immigrant status of their great majority. 
            The replicator equation is one of the standard frameworks for evolutionary 
analysis. It is used for modelling the changes in population proportion of types through 
selection mechanisms. This work proposes a modified version for the replicator equation 
that incorporates incentives behind social influence suggested to be conformity and 
status-seeking. In my proposed version they are formulated in terms of population 
proportions, leaving the analytical tractability of the replicator equation intact. The 
equation is then examined in order to derive its main patterns. It is shown through 
illustrative examples that this version of the equation proves to be both empirically useful 
and theoretically instructive. 
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I. Introduction 
Attitude towards risk is important when it comes to decisions regarding artistic       
endeavour: whether deciding what to create, when to create it, how to create it, or for 
whom to create it, a work of art carries an uncertain return.  In some cases this uncertainty 
involves low probabilities of large payoff.  In other cases it can be argued that the 
uncertainty involves unknown probabilities of payoffs, or ambiguity. 
In practice, the expected financial return of works of art and literature, upon their 
inception and before the resolution of uncertainty about the actual value of the work, 
turns into a transferable title, a copyright, with a market determined value. Therefore the 
artist is able to exchange the uncertain financial return for a guaranteed lump sum amount 
of money and the risks are transferred to the eventual buyer of the title, perhaps a 
professional investor who is in the position of pooling the risks.  While the artist must still 
evaluate risks to decide on keeping or selling the title (copyright), copyright institution 
gives “an option” to the artist to replace his or her risky compensation with a sure amount 
of money.  
The situation created by the institution of copyright seems desirable since it 
provides the artist with an opportunity to decide on the amount of risk she or he is willing 
to bear at each point in time. Still, the flexibility in managing the risks inherent to the 
artistic undertaking offered by copyright does not equally benefit all copyrighted works. 
The reason is a material impossibility: not all works of art can be reproduced. Although 
painting and sculpture are subject to copyright prerogatives, since it is impossible to 
disassociate them from their original material form, the copyright attribute that entitles 
the author to receive the financial yields of the reproduction of the work is naturally 
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inoperative. Hence, the principal way for a visual artist to monetize her or his works 
amounts to selling its material form1
After the French recognition of this right in the first half of the 20th century, other 
countries in continental Europe have gradually adopted a version of it (an except is 
Switzerland).  Legally speaking, droit de suite became a part of copyright dispositions in 
Civil Law (as opposed to Common Law) regimes. In European Common Law countries, 
the adoption was long debated but has only taken place recently as a result of an EU 
harmonization directive in 2001. The EU directive led to the recognition of this right in 
. 
Since copyright includes, in general, the right of the author to financially profit 
from reproduction, display, and adaptation of the work, one can easily see how, for 
example, a written symphony, a movie, and a painting will necessarily result in different 
components of copyright for their respective authors. This point, the natural impossibility 
of reproduction in painting and sculpture, has been gradually considered by most 
legislators and as a result the copyright on painting and sculpture often incorporates a 
special attribute that is usually called droit de suite for the sake of its French origin 
(meaning right to follow and translated to visual artists’ resale royalty or resale royalty 
for short in English speaking countries; in this paper these terms are used 
interchangeably). The visual artists' resale royalty right, or droit de suite, entitles the 
author of an original work in the domain of visual arts (i.e., painting and sculpture) to an 
economic interest in its successive sales, usually in form of a percentage of the price 
received by the owner of the work, subject to certain legal requirements. 
                                                          
1 Although producing posters, lithographs and the like from visual art works are regulated by copyright 
laws around the world they are not reproduction in its legal sense as they involve the change in the medium 
of expression. And note that first, they became possible only in the later parts of 20th century; second, their 
monetary yield for the artists tend to be modest. We use “reproduction” in this paper in its strict legal sense. 
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the UK and the Republic of Ireland. As of Common Law countries outside EU, Australian 
artists have long argued that the lack of recognition of droit de suite disadvantages them 
in comparison with their counterparts in other countries. Finally, Australia and New 
Zealand integrated droit de suite into their national legislations in 2009. In Canada, droit 
de suite is not invested and in the United States this right is only recognized in the state of 
California. Given the considerable share of the United States in the market of visual arts, 
the US recognition of this right at the federal level is a consequential economic issue. 
Harmonization of the law across the world could stimulate trade by providing comparable 
financial returns regardless of the jurisdiction in which the sale takes place and also by 
taking away the complexity of the possible legal matters emanating from the involvement 
of multiple jurisdictions (conflict of laws) with different regulations2
                                                          
2 Conflict of laws is a set of procedural rules which determine which legal system, and the law of which 
jurisdiction, applies to a given dispute. The rules typically apply when a legal dispute has a foreign element 
from the stand point of the judicial system in which the dispute is being resolved (such as a contract agreed 
by parties located in different countries). The jurisdiction in which the dispute is being resolved impacts the 
national law that will be ultimately applied.  If the contents of national legislations are different then this 
jurisdiction becomes important for the outcome of the dispute.  
. 
Most economists who have analyzed this right have concluded that it is relatively 
inefficient due to its intervention in the free negotiations of sellers (artists) and buyers 
(dealers/collectors). This conclusion has contributed to the lack of recognition of this 
right in the US, leading to the current discrepancy in the contents of copyright laws 
among developed countries. This situation may induce the artists (dealers) to prefer 
selling or auctioning  the works in the jurisdictions where such right is (not) recognised 
such as Paris or London (New York) creating a form of art auction haven. Moreover, it 
can cause important and costly legal complications in the cross-border movement of such 
works of art.  
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Visual artists’ resale royalty right creates a sui-generis scheme of decision under 
uncertainty by affecting not only the total payoff of such artistic endeavours but also the 
distribution of payoffs over time. Given the behavioural biases previously uncovered in 
such settings, it is plausible to think that the institution is susceptible to affect artists’ 
decisions about the sale of their works (as opposed to retaining it for themselves) but also 
their production decisions and, as we will argue in this paper, their welfare.  
This paper contributes to the literature examining the efficiency of this institution 
from the angle of artists’ incentive to sell their work under this right, using an 
experimental approach. The results are also used to shed light on the artists’ production 
decision and their welfare. We conjecture that the institution may adversely affect the 
number of transactions in the art market due to a version of endowment effect. We also 
conjecture that, assuming the degree of risk aversion is affected by the magnitude of the 
stakes, the resale royalty institution may similarly lead to fewer transactions in the market 
while adversely affecting artists’ welfare as well; both of the effects resulting from 
lowered risk aversion in face of this institution. Analysing our results, which turn to be in 
accordance with these conjectures, we conclude that fixing a relatively high threshold for 
this right to take effect can largely eliminate the adverse impact of the institution on the 
number of transactions while providing incentive for more promising artists. We also 
examine the ability of a non-expected utility model to fit the experimental data, further 
providing evidences that the resale royalty regime induces behaviours not adequately 
foreseeable by the rational choice framework, as will be detailed in the subsequent 
sections. 
            The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we elaborate 
on the institution’s origin and its implications on the visual artists’ behaviour. The next 
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section elaborates on the design of the experiment. The analysis of experimental data and 
the results of our estimations follow. The last section concludes.  
II. Behavioural Impact of Resale Royalty  
Looking at the history of visual arts, it can be argued that the uncertainty of 
payoffs and its ensuing impact on the artists’ stream of income has contributed to the 
prevalence of the patronage system from ancient times until modern era. During this long 
period, the members of aristocracy provided the artists of their choice with financial 
support in its absence the creation of works of art would be greatly undermined. In some 
sense the patron acted as the principal and the artist as the agent. The transition of social 
institutions into their modern visage eliminated the patronage system and let laws and 
other social institutions take the place of private patrons. From this instance, it should be 
expected that these institutions provide a set of comparable incentives for the creation of 
visual arts. It is shown that droit de suite is, in fact, an efficient tool when the policy-
maker intends to promote the production of visual arts, due to its compatibility with the 
optimal contract for the context (see Dilmaghani, 2008). However, droit de suite has been 
originally conceived to improve financial situation of the artists rather than the promotion 
of visual arts. 
The anecdote behind the original creation of droit de suite goes as follows. The 
French painter Jean-François Millet's 1858 famous painting, L’Angélus, was resold after 
the First World War in an auction at a considerable price, while the artist's family was 
living in poverty. It is said that the painter’s daughter had been selling flowers in the 
7 
 
streets of Paris at exact same day of the auction3
This right is typically specified by law as a percentage share of the sale price 
which decreases as the sale value of the work of art increases. It covers a period similar to 
the validity period of other copyrights. Moreover, the right is inalienable, which means 
that the artist cannot contractually or otherwise withdraw from it at the moment of the 
. The account of this event reached the 
French Parliament and as a result the resale royalty right was conceived. 
Hence, historically, two considerations have motivated the French legislator to 
grant this right: the material welfare of the artist and fairness. Given that, unlike other 
artistic and literary works, visual art works cannot be reproduced in the strict sense, the 
monetary compensation of artistic endeavour for a non negligible proportion of these 
artists can be quite modest. Furthermore it is usual that the price of a piece of art 
substantially increases over time, usually as a result of the establishment of the artist's 
name and reputation. In economic terms, there is a positive externality instigated by the 
artist’s later success in her or his career to the benefit of the subsequent owners of any of 
this artist’s works and droit de suite acts to internalize this externality. This implication of 
the right is usually interpreted as the legislator’s fairness concerns. We notice in the more 
recent commentaries that the concern of legislators and the rationale behind the right 
have been widely interpreted as protecting the weaker party of the transaction (the artist) 
against the abuse of the party with higher bargaining power (the art dealer). This 
interpretation implies that a priori there is a discrepancy between the desirable solution in 
eyes of a hypothetic central planner and the market solution. 
                                                          
3 Jean-François Millet (1814-1875) spent his youth working on the land, but by 1837 he arrived in Paris and 
eventually enrolled in the studio of Paul Delaroche. The peasant subjects from the early 1850s were Millet's 
principal concern as a result, periodically faced the charge of being a socialist.  Important collections of 
Millet's pictures are to be found in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and in the Louvre. 
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first sale or later on. In some sense this right makes an exception over normal attributes of 
property rights since it creates a legislatorial quasi-shared ownership over the 
stochastically valued property of the work of art. In some other sense it forces the artists 
to subscribe for a statutory insurance plan, for in the state of their success they receive 
extra compensation in exchange of, as we will elaborate on below, a somewhat lower first 
sale price.  
Not all paintings and sculptures are eligible for resale royalty. In general, all 
legislations have limited the right to the cases where the work is resold in an auction or 
via a professional art dealer and its resale price is higher than a legally specified 
threshold. Table 1 displays the ranges of resale prices and their corresponding regulatory 
percentage share of the artist along with the average amount of royalty received by the 
artist within each range, as it can be currently found in French law. 
What is the effect of droit de suite on the market for visual arts?  In other words, 
how the equilibrium values of the market (the number of transactions and the price) will 
be affected by resale royalty? Many economists who have analyzed this right have 
concluded that it is rather inefficient for various reasons. For instance, Greffe (2005) 
found evidences that it reduces the number of transactions in the market as well as the 
first sale’s price, resulting in an adverse economic effect on the artists especially the 
young ones (Coase 1972, is a more general treatment of this issue).  Solow (1998), in a 
model of optimal risk sharing, reaches the conclusion that droit de suite results in 
inefficient risk taking of a risk-averse artist contracting with a risk-neutral dealer. 
Stanford (2003) argues against the administrative costs of implementation of droit de 
suite. Other researchers emphasize market structure in the analysis of the impact of droit 
de suite: Perloff (2003), for example, discusses the uneven bargaining power between 
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artists and art dealers, concluding that the dealers earn excess profits at the expense of the 
young artists hence droit de suite is a desirable remedy (see also Filer 1986). 
Overall, the interventionist nature of this right has motivated more criticism than 
support among economists. The conclusion that droit de suite is inefficient, expressed by 
the majority of economists, has contributed to the non-harmonization of the right across 
legislations. From the view point of general economic principles, both willingness to pay 
(alternatively termed WTP) and willingness to accept (alternatively termed WTA) for a 
painting (or sculptor) in its first sale should decrease in a regime that enforces droit de 
suite. The reasoning is straightforward: the selling artist may receive extra compensations 
through resales in the future, while the buyer (dealer or private owner other than the artist 
herself) will have to pay a percentage of the price received in a future transaction to the 
artist. These two effects act on the willingness to accept (willingness to pay) of the artists 
(dealers) towards an overall higher (lower) price received than the first sale price. Thus, 
the market equilibrium first sale price is expected to decline, but not necessarily the 
number of transactions. The extension of this simple analysis to the number of 
transactions (and its postulated fall) requires further assumptions such as risk aversion of 
the artists and risk neutrality of the dealers. 
However, since the revenues from resale royalty are uncertain (they are 
conditioned on the incidence of resale at a price higher than the legal threshold within the 
validity term of the resale royalty) and occur over time, when one takes into account the 
behaviour biases in risk and time discounting then predicting the impact of the institution 
may not be as straightforward as it seems. This study is conceived to further investigate 
the impact of droit de suite on market equilibrium values taking into account some of the 
well-known behavioural biases in decision making in such contexts.  
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First conjecture is the impact of endowment effect. Endowment effect postulates 
that agents tend to demand more money for an object they already own than when they do 
not own it. Endowment effect is mainly documented, in experimental studies and survey 
elicitation methods, through the larger sum expressed as the willingness to accept than the 
willingness to pay for the same object (see for instance Hammack and Brown 1974; Rowe 
et al. 1980; Knetch and Sinden 1984; Brookshire and Coursey 1987; Knetch 1989). 
There have been a vast number of theoretical and empirical studies detailing and 
explaining this effect and attempts have been made at explaining it. One explanation 
involves the fact that economic theory itself predicts this phenomenon for goods with no 
close substitutes (Hanemann 1991 and Shogren et al. 1994). It is reasonable to assume 
that a significant proportion of visual art works fall into this class of non-substitutable 
good, making it a plausible candidate for a study involving elicitation of willingness to 
accept (willingness to pay) on the part of the artists (dealers). 
Note that endowment effect must be present with or without resale royalty but we 
conjecture that the bias can be exacerbated by the institution: droit de suite practically and 
psychologically extends the ownership relationship of the artist to the work in time by 
setting the artists to receive a percentage from each resale price. This feature of the right, 
we believe, can intensify the bias caused by endowment effect pushing the willingness to 
accept in the first sale upward. 
Second, using general neoclassical theory principles, both risk and time 
preferences would operate on decisions in a market place involving droit de suite and 
these two concepts are associated with behavioural biases as well. Simply put, risk 
aversion would lead to a lower acceptance price on the part of the artist (swapping a sure 
payment for a gamble), as would discounting over time. But while economic theory 
11 
 
makes a straightforward prediction, actual behaviour may be different. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) provided the first evidences and modelled with their prospect theory, the 
fact that people appear to overweigh small probabilities of good outcomes in gambles. 
The extent to which an artist may believe that there is a small probability of a large payoff 
for his or her art may have an important effect on the price he or she expects to receive. 
Again, this bias must be present with or without resale royalty but the interaction 
of this bias and resale royalty can work to actually, all else equal, diminish the 
willingness to accept for the work in the first sale. The reasoning is straightforward: if the 
small probability of a subsequent resale is overweighed by the artist then the expected 
future payoffs through resale royalty are overvalued and this brings the artist’s 
willingness to accept in the first sale down. 
Third, there are evidences that the lager the stake the greater the degree of risk 
aversion (Holt and Laury 2002; Engle-Warnick, Escobal, and Laszlo 2009). The existence 
of resale royalty makes the risky stakes smaller therefore it is susceptible of impacting 
risk aversion downward causing the artists to ask for a higher price in the first sale.  
The issue of time-discounting and its associated behavioural biases come into play 
given that resale royalty is granted for a significant period of time. It means that the 
expected stream of revenues from resale royalty, considered at the moment of the first 
sale, should be discounted by the artist. A standard behavioural finding associated with 
intertemporal decision making is the present bias where subjects discount the present 
payoffs vs. the immediate future payoffs more heavily than they do between any other 
two adjacent periods both situated in the future. Hyperbolic discounting is another 
interpretation of the observed biases in actual behaviour compared to discounted utility 
framework (e.g. Rubinstein 2003; Behabib and Bisin 2004; Anderson et. al.  2008, Engle-
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Warnick, Heroux and Montmarquette 2009, and the references therein; see also Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002, for a survey of previous studies). 
Setting aside the issue of time preferences for the current research and supposing 
that the work of art produced by a visual artist (i.e., either a painting or a sculptor) is 
analogous to a lottery.  Based on the experimental evidences and behavioural findings 
that have been mentioned in the above we can put forward three behavioural conjectures 
about the impact of resale royalty on the artists’ willingness to accept. They are listed 
below. 
            First, as a long line of evidence exists that the endowment effect biases 
willingness to accept for gambles owned by the decision maker in a similar manner to the 
objects we think: 
(1) All else equal, artists’ (experiment subjects’) valuations elicited through their 
willingness to accept for a lottery (standing for a work of art) will be higher in the 
presence of droit de suite. This conjecture is based on the extended sense of “ownership” 
created by the resale royalty institution for the creating artist. 
            Second, prospect theory states that subjects overweight small probabilities of good 
outcomes: 
(2) All else equal, artists’ (experiment subjects’) willingness to accept will be higher for 
the lotteries with low probabilities of high outcomes. This pattern in combination with the 
fact that resale royalty only covers works priced higher than a legally specified threshold 
means that, all else equal, the artists may state a relatively lower willingness to accept in 
the presence of resale royalty institution. The reason is that overestimating the low 
probability of a future high price for the work results in a higher expected future payoff 
hence lowering the willingness to accept in the first sale. 
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            Third, according to Holt and Laury (2002), the degree of risk aversion is affected 
by the magnitude of the stakes hence: 
(3) As resale royalty makes the stakes of risk taking smaller then the artist should become 
less risk-averse in the presence of resale royalty. Lowered risk aversion affects 
willingness to accept upward as expected utility gets closer to expected value. 
            Putting (1), (2) and (3) together (two effects towards a higher willingness to 
accept and one towards a lower one), we conjecture that willingness to accept will decline 
less than proportionally with the resale royalty i.e., less than how willingness to accept 
would have fallen in the absence of these behavioural biases (inclusive of risk aversion as 
postulated by neoclassical theory). This implication of droit de suite may lead to the fall 
of the number of transactions especially if the professional art dealers are more prone to 
decide based on rational choice principles without being subject to behavioural biases: 
with this institution the artist’s willingness to accept falls less than the dealer’s 
willingness to pay resulting in the incident of failure to transact. We expect to find this 
pattern -less than proportionate fall of willingness to accept- in settings meant to replicate 
resale royalty institution in our experiment. The details of the design follow.  
III. Design of the Experiment 
We are interested in the impact of droit de suite on the reservation price of an 
artist for her or his painting or a sculpture. Thus, our experimental design embeds a 
standard measure for risk preferences: incentive-compatible elicitation of WTA. We 
model the art produced by an artist as a lottery, with risky payoffs4
                                                          
4 As it is our first examination of this subject, we abstracted from the issue of time preferences, interpreting 
our lotteries as total present values of an income stream. 
. We model skill-
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dependant types of work by a safe gamble, while original works whose value may 
tremendously differ according to the state of the world are captured by risky gambles5
Therefore, we were able to compare subjects’ responses under the standard 
elicitation of risk preferences (0% royalty) with their responses when they retain a portion 
of the lottery (5% and 20% royalty) as we observed ten decisions for each category per 
subject. Our experimental design embeds another test of revealed preference over 
.  
Under resale royalty, the artist retains a fraction of the value realized from all 
future sales of her or his art, and in our experiment the subject retains a fraction of the 
lottery payoffs.  In the absence of resale royalty, the artist accepts payment and forfeits 
property rights over any future sale, and in our experiment the subject retains no part of 
the lottery payoffs. This design allows us to test our behavioural conjecture that resale 
royalty institution is susceptible to diminishing risk aversion. 
The subjects have been endowed with 30 lotteries and were asked to express their 
WTA for them. The lotteries can be divided into two categories: (1) safe gambles whose 
payoffs were either $15 or $25; (2) risky whose payoffs were either $1 or $40. We 
constructed 5 risky and 5 safe gambles by varying the probability of the low outcome as 
follows: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. Thus, there are ten basic gambles in the design, five 
safe ($15 or $25) and five risky ($1 or $40). Resale royalty is accounted for by 20 extra 
questions in which subjects are asked to express their WTA for only 95% of the lotteries’ 
payoff and only 80% of the lotteries’ payoff while retaining the remaining portion of the 
gambles.  Our design therefore led to six different configurations. 
                                                          
5 One may argue that the uncertainty seen by the artist is endogenous in the sense that, for example, the 
artist may be making an effort to build a reputation.  The advantage of the experimental laboratory is that 
one may abstract from such issues and focus, as we do here, directly and solely on the effect of retaining a 
fraction of the property being sold. Issues such as time and endogeneity remain open questions for future 
studies. 
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lotteries: the impact of resale royalty on decision making when the lottery has a high 
variance compared with when it has a low variance (i.e., risky versus safe gambles).  
The decision tasks were provided to the subjects in six decision sheets, each 
containing the five different gambles associated with the five variations in the probability 
of the outcomes of the gambles. The gambles were presented as pie-charts, and 
probabilities of outcomes were communicated as “chances out of 100”.  The pie-charts 
were arranged in descending order with respect to the probability of the good outcome.  
The six decision sheets were randomly ordered for each subject (see Hey and Orme 1994 
and Wilcox 1997 for comparable concerns). An example of the decision sheet is given 
along with the experimental instructions in Annex 2. Table 2 summarises the decision 
tasks. 
Insert Table 2. 
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the questions featured in the experimental 
design as well as the gambles’ expected value. The table is divided into two halves, left 
and right, presenting the payoffs for a relatively risky gamble (either $1 or $40), and for a 
relatively safe gamble (either $15 or $25).  The rows of the table show the five risky and 
five safe gambles. Each half of the upper panel of Table 2 is sub-divided into three 
columns representing the three resale royalty regimes. The column labelled 0% represents 
the absence of resale royalty.  The columns labelled 5% and 20% represent situations 
where, upon the sale of the lottery, the subject still retains either 5% or 20% of the 
lotteries’ payoffs respectively. It was made clear to the subjects that in the latter cases the 
remainder of the lotteries would be played and they would receive the outcome in 
addition to their payoff from the portion (95% or 80%) whose ownership was set to be 
transferred. 
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The cells of the table present the valuation for each lottery by a risk-neutral 
expected utility maximizer. For example, for the gamble with a 0.1 probability of $1 and 
a 0.9 probability of $40, this valuation (expected value) is $36.10.  For the gamble with a 
0.5 probability of $15 and 0.5 probability of $25, this valuation (expected value) is $20.  
For these same gambles with a 20% royalty, the valuations reduce to $28.88 and $16.00 
respectively. 
 We used the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (1964) procedure to elicit valuations in an 
incentive compatible manner. Briefly, the subject states their willingness to accept, and 
then a number is drawn from the uniform distribution with a support from $0 to $50. If 
the number drawn is larger than or equal to the stated WTA, then the subject receives 
payment in the amount of the number drawn and surrenders the lottery.  Otherwise, the 
subject keeps the lottery.  
 This procedure, which amounts to a second-price auction with the experimenter as 
a random bidder, may prove complicated for untrained subjects to fully understand, and 
for this reason it may result in noisy subject responses. To counteract this, we explained 
the procedure to the subjects, and gave standard examples as to why it was not in their 
best interest to misreport their valuation. Subjects took a quiz after the experimenter read 
out loud the instructions and answered any questions.  The experiment continued after all 
subjects’ answers had been corrected by the experimenters. The instructions are replicated 
in Annex 2. 
 Sixty-four subjects participated in the experiment, thirty of whom were men, and 
all of which were drawn from the standard subject pool consisting primarily of 
undergraduates and recent graduates of universities located in the province of Québec, 
Canada. Thirty-one subjects reported themselves as students, while the rest were self-
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employed, employed in the private or public sector, or unemployed. The average age of 
the participants was twenty-six. 
            Subjects were paid for one decision, randomly chosen from all thirty decisions 
they made in the experiment, plus a $10 show-up fee which is standard at our 
experimental laboratory.  The subjects were paid privately, and the randomization was 
done using the random number generator function in Excel. Overall, thirty-three subjects 
actually exchanged their lottery for cash, and the average payment was $45, including the 
$10 show-up fee.  
Finally, a note on the external validity of our experiment is in order. It can be argued that 
the population of artists may have a different risk preference distribution compared to the 
subjects in our experiment (see King 1974, Caves 2003). We have considered this 
question prior to the design of our study. There are two distinct arguments for the external 
validity of our experiment. First, the question we address is about the decisions made by 
young, debuting artists that share many characteristic with the subjects of your 
experiment, mainly young students. Second, our intention is to compare the impact of two 
different institutional setting on risk preferences, taking as given the individual fixed 
effects. In other words, the intention is to learn about the relative impact of the institution. 
Therefore, we expect that, although the two populations’ risk-preferences may differ, the 
relative impact of the institution must be qualitatively comparable across the populations.  
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IV. Results 
In this section the results of the experiment are presented. In the first subsection 
we report the descriptive statistics obtained from our experimental data. In the next 
subsection we assume various latent decision making models and we estimate the 
parameters of these models. 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 The lower panel of Table 2 presents mean willingness to pay for all decision tasks 
in the experiment. The table includes data from our 64 subjects6
          Most importantly, it is visible that the subjects’ valuations are not declining 
proportionally with the increase in the percentage royalty that they are supposed to 
receive subsequently. Roughly speaking, for example, for the risky gamble of 0.1 
probability of best outcome, $37.45, the mean reported willingness to accept for 5% 
. First, comparing the 
lower panel of Table 2 with the risk-neutral predictions in the upper panel, subjects 
appear to be risk-loving. This is in contrast with some other reported results, as in Holt 
and Laury (2002), where the subjects’ behaviour is found to be typically risk-averse 
(however, note that Holt and Laury experiment differs from ours in eliciting risk 
preferences through binary choices rather than willingness to accept). This is consistent 
with our first prediction of the effect of WTA on revealed risk preferences. Also, 
consistent with our second behavioural prediction, subjects appear to be overvaluing the 
lotteries with a 0.9 probability of the low outcome, compared with gambles of higher 
probability of the better outcome. 
                                                          
6 We dropped two subjects from the sample as their answers revealed they did not understand the 
experimental protocol.  Because the maximum amount that the computer could draw under the BDM 
procedure was $50, reported WTA's above this amount convey no information consistent with incentive 
compatibility of the experiment.  Therefore the WTAs are truncated at $50. This truncation did affect 
quantitatively or qualitatively the estimation results. 
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royalty is not a 5% discount on $36.99, which was the mean willingness to accept 
reported for no royalty, and $35.89 is certainly not a 20% discount on $36.99.  Strikingly, 
Table 3, which conducts statistical tests for the difference across royalty levels report no 
difference in WTA even at the 10% level.  Thus, there is no discernable pattern of 
proportionate decreases across the table as the royalty percentage increases, which is 
consistent with our behavioural prediction. 
Insert Table 3.  
 We wanted a better look at the distribution of WTA given the failure of t-tests in 
Table 3 to detect a statistically significant difference between WTA across royalty levels 
termed Premium).  Figure 1 and Figure 2 present non-parametric plots of the distribution 
of the difference between WTA and expected value of the gambles aggregated across 
subjects and gambles.  Figure 1 shows the difference in distribution between a royalty 
rate of 0% and 5%, and Figure 2 shows the same for royalty rates of 0% and 20%.  Notice 
that there is no discernable difference in Figure 1, but Figure 2 reveals a consistently 
higher premium above expected value for a royalty rate of 20%.   
            A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of the equivalence of the 
distributions in Figure-2, but it does not reject it for Figure 1. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test fails to reject in either case. Thus, these figures provide some support for the 
hypothesis that the level of royalty share makes a difference that translates into a change 
of parameter in the expected utility model. 
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3 presents the non parametric density estimation of the difference between 
the subjects’ WTA and the expected value of the gamble, comparing safe vs. risky 
gambles. As we can see, the distributions are not identical and the mean of Premium is 
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noticeably higher for risky gambles (while both means are strictly positive values). A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of the identity of the distributions, 
as does the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
3.2. Parametric Estimations 
We fit an expected utility model to the aggregate data using the Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA) functional form, which is standard in economics experiments. 
The method of fit is non-linear least squares. The results are presented in Table 4. We 
provide two types of estimates in the table. The first row reports the regression results 
using our pooled data. The second row shows the mean estimate of the parameter when 
we fit the model subject-by-subject, using the thirty observations we have for each 
subject. The underlying model is provided below. 
𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏  
           
The general conclusion that we can draw from the results reported in Table 4 is that the 
subjects appear to be slightly risk-loving, evident from the statistically significant 
negative estimated values of 𝑟𝑟.  
Insert Table 4. 
A simple alternative specification is to allow the parameter of the utility function 
to vary with the type of gamble being safe or risky as defined in this paper.  We did this 
by splitting the sample and estimating the coefficient of relative risk aversion separately 
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for each type of our lotteries7
                                                          
7 We have also estimated this model for females and males separately. We found that females are slightly 
less risk-loving (approximately risk-neutral) compared to males as it was also found is Eckel et al. (1998). 
The results are reported in Table 9.  
. The results are reported in Table 5 and the underlying 
model can be written as in below. 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔:    𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏           
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓:  𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏      
  
Insert Table 5. 
The results in Table 5 show that the subjects’ responses are just very slightly 
closer to risk-neutral in the safe gambles, while for risky gambles the estimate shows 
slightly more risk-loving behaviour (the parameter 𝑟𝑟 turns out to be -0.035 in safe 
gambles versus 0.037 in risky ones). The results reported in Table 5 do not make a case, 
however, for a statistically significantly different behaviour across the two types of 
gambles. 
Next, we considered the case in which the parameter of the utility function, as 
specified at the end of this paragraph, varied according to the type of sale. The results are 
presented in Table 6 where each column of the table represents the estimated parameter 
for each of the three different royalty rates (inclusive of 0% royalty). Again, risk-loving 
behaviour is exhibited in all three cases, and consistent with intuition gleaned from Table 
3, the degree of risk-loving indecisions increases, which means expressing higher WTAs, 
with the increase in the royalty rate in accordance to our behavioural conjecture (the 
parameter 𝑟𝑟 turns out to be -0.023; -0.032 and -0.066 in 0%; 5% and 20% royalty 
respectively). The underlying model is provided below. 
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⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝒔𝒔 𝑺𝑺𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒔𝒔 (𝟎𝟎% 𝒓𝒓𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓):    𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏        
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗% 𝑺𝑺𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒔𝒔 (𝟗𝟗% 𝒓𝒓𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓):     𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝟖𝟖𝟎𝟎% 𝑺𝑺𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒔𝒔 (𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎% 𝒓𝒓𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔𝑾𝑾𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓):   𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝒓𝒓𝟑𝟑 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟐
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏    
  
Insert Table 6. 
Having estimated expected utility models with an eye on differences between 
types of lotteries, we now turn to a non-expected utility model looking for evidence of the 
bias of overweighting small probabilities of good outcomes.  Following Loomes et al. 
(2002), we estimated a specification based on rank-dependant utility (RDU) model. The 
version of the model that corresponds to our estimation is as follows. 
𝑬𝑬𝑼𝑼(𝑿𝑿) = ∑ 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊(𝟏𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹𝒃𝒃) 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝟏𝟏−𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏                 
 The variable 𝛿𝛿 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 is if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  is the smallest 
probability of the good outcome of the set of lotteries and zero otherwise. If 𝑏𝑏�=0 
(estimated value of 𝑏𝑏 is not statistically significantly different from zero) it indicates no 
bias while a negative value of 𝑏𝑏� indicates that the subjects overweighed the lowest 
probability of the good outcome. Note that here again we estimated this model both on 
aggregate data and separately for each type of gambles (safe and risky). The results of the 
estimations are reported in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7.  
Two items are revealed by the results reported in the left panel of Table 7 (pooled 
regression). First, the estimated degree of risk-loving behaviour slightly decreases when 
we change from general specification to this specification (from -0.037 to -0.035) 
meaning that the subjects may be deemed less risk-loving if this bias in the perception of 
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the probabilities is accounted for. Second, as it has been found in other experiments, the 
estimated value of 𝑏𝑏 is negative (-1.184), which provides evidences for the conjecture that 
subjects overweigh the lowest probability of the good outcomes in deciding about the 
magnitude of the expected payoffs. The adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 slightly declines as we change from 
the expected utility specification to the rank-dependant utility proposed by Loomes.  
Looking at the right panel of Table 7, containing the split-sample estimations of 
the parameters 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑏𝑏, we notice that the parameter 𝑏𝑏 is positive for safe gambles (0.33) 
and the subjects are found to be more risk-loving compared to their outcome of risky 
gambles. This counter-intuitive result can be explained recalling that rank-dependant 
utility model is not an appropriate framework of analysis when the good outcome does 
not substantially differ from the bad outcome. This is the case with our safe gambles ($15 
versus $25). We believe it is for this reason that the rank-dependant utility model does not 
lead to plausible values for the parameters 𝑏𝑏 and 𝑟𝑟 in here. 
Using the rank-dependant utility framework we also treated the three types of 
sales (whole, 95%, 80%) as separate samples. The results are presented in Table 8. Here, 
we find that the differences among out three sub-samples follow the same direction as in 
the split-sample estimations resulting from expected utility model frameworks:  we find 
again that as the resale royalty percentage increases the subjects become more risk-
loving. The differences in the parameter 𝑏𝑏 are negligible (-1.113; -1.120 and -1.121 for 
whole, 95%, 80% respectively). In this case as well, the adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 slightly declines 
compared to the expected utility model estimations8
                                                          
8 Rank dependant utility model has been estimated for male and female separately. The results of these 
estimations are reported in Table-10. 
. 
Insert Table 8. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Visual artists’ resale royalty, recognised in the EU countries, Australia and New 
Zealand, creates a shared ownership of the copyrighted work’s financial yield from its 
successive resales. In the United States and Canada, there is no federal recognition of the 
visual artists’ resale royalty right. Examining the question of economic efficiency of this 
institution can contribute to the harmonisation of national laws in this matter, at least, 
among developed countries.  
We examined the implication of resale royalty regime thorough an experiment 
replicating the decision making context with and without resale royalty. We modeled 
visual art works as lotteries. Our experiment allowed us to infer subjects’ risk 
preferences, and to observe their behaviour under two different royalty rates. We found 
evidences that the setting intended to replicate resale royalty institution decreased 
subjects’ risk aversion. The conclusion came after the observation that subjects did not 
discount their WTA fully in line with the size of the royalty. We also found that this 
effect is enhanced when there is a relatively small probability of a relatively large payoff.  
This finding implies that with resale royalty institution, the number of transactions 
in the market for visual arts can decline. The number of transactions must be expected to 
decline provided that art dealers are more prone to decide in accordance with the rational 
choice framework and are risk-neutral. We also used a non-expected utility model to fit 
the experimental data, further providing evidence that the resale royalty regime induces 
behavioural outcomes not adequately predicted by neoclassical theory. 
How might this affect the artists’ welfare?  Definitive answers can only be 
determined by further study involving both sides of the market.  However, if we assume a 
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difference in bargaining power between the artist (seller) and the dealer (buyer) and given 
that a fraction of artists are probably obliged to sell their work at any offer for their 
subsistence then the artists are not likely to be able to receive the prices they desire for 
their art at the time of the first sale and, this lowers their welfare. In any case, our results 
suggest that a resale royalty regime may leave sellers dissatisfied with the prices they 
receive in the market place, even if those prices would have deemed reasonable to them 
prior to resale royalty regime.  
We believe that increasing the legal threshold of the resale price required for the 
applicability of the resale royalty right can limit its impact on the first sale price to the 
exceptionally promising artists who are likely to be the beneficiaries of the resale royalty 
later in their career. We believe this amendment can mitigate the above-described adverse 
effect of the institution on other (especially young) artists while promoting the 
continuation of artistic endeavours among more promising ones. 
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Annex 1: Tables and Figures 
Table 1.    
Resale Royalty in France 
Resale Price in € Royalty % Average Royalty 
1-3.000 0 0 
3.001-50.000 4 1.060 
50.001-200.000 3 3.750 
200.001-350.000 1 2.750 
350.001-500.000 0.5 2.125 
500.000 and higher 0.25 1.250 and higher 
Note 
The information in this table is extracted from  «Code de la propriété intellectuelle, version consolidée 
au 1 décembre 2009». 
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Table 2.  
Risk Neutral Predictions for the Experiment’s Lotteries 
 Risky Gamble ($1 or $40) Safe Gamble ($15 or $25) 
 
Probability   
(Low Outcome) 
Royalty (%)  Royalty (%) 
0% 5% 20% 0% 5% 20% 
0.1 36.10 34.30 28.88 24.00 22.80 19.20 
0.3 28.30 26.89 22.64 22.00 20.90 17.60 
0.5 20.50 19.48 16.40 20.00 19.00 16.00 
0.7 12.70 12.07 10.16 18.00 17.10 14.40 
0.9 4.90 4.66 3.92 16.00 15.20 12.80 
Note :  
This panel contains Expected value (WTA for a risk neutral utility maximizing agent). 
Mean WTA from the Experimental Data 
 Risky Gamble ($1 or $40) Safe Gamble ($15 or $25) 
 
Probability   
(Low Outcome) 
Royalty (%)  Royalty (%) 
0% 5% 20% 0% 5% 20% 
0.1 36.99 37.45 35.89 27.29 26.02 25.01 
0.3 32.34 30.81 30.21 24.67 24.33 23.45 
0.5 24.36 24.12 22.84 21.84 20.64 20.92 
0.7 17.55 17.45 16.32 18.33 18.46 17.79 
0.9 12.84 12.60 11.50 16.55 16.80 17.04 
Note 
This panel contains the mean WTA form the experiment with 64 subjects. 
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Table 3.   
Mean WTA Comparison between Whole Sales and Partial Sales. 
 t-statistic: Risky Gamble t-statistic: Safe Gamble 
Probability (Low 
Outcome) 0%-5% 0%-20% 0%-5% 0%-20% 
0.1 0.903 1.674 0.311 0.728 
0.3 0.274 0.978 0.120 1.146 
0.5 1.262 0.845 0.120 0.781 
0.7 0.142 0.613 0.055 0.642 
0.9 0.272 -0.474 0.120 0.679 
Note 
This table contains cross-tabulation of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis of the equality of means of the 
subjects’ WTA as reported in lower panel of Table 2. 
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Table 4. 
Expected Utility (CRRA) Parameter Estimates: Pooled vs. Individual 
 Pooled Regression Individual Regressions 
Parameter r -0.037** (0.002) 
-0.030 
(0.062) 
Adjusted R2 0.8689 --- 
Number of Obs. 1920 1920 
Note 
The indication ** means the estimate is significant at 5% level while * indicates significance at 10% 
level; standard errors are in parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 5.  
Expected Utility (CRRA) Parameter Estimates: Safe vs. Risky 
 Safe Lotteries Risky Lotteries 
Parameter ri 
-0.035** 
(0.002) 
-0.037** 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.9169 0.8378 
Number of Obs. 960 960 
Note 
The indication ** means the estimate is significant at 5% level while * indicates significance at 10% 
level; standard errors are in parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 6.  
Expected Utility (CRRA)  Parameter Estimates Across Royalty Rates 
 0% Royalty 5% Royalty 20% Royalty 
Parameter ri 
-0.023** 
(0.003) 
-0.032** 
(0.003) 
-0.066** 
(0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.877 0.871 
Number of Obs. 640 640 640 
Note 
The indication ** means the estimate is significant at 5% level while * indicates significance at 10% 
level; standard errors are in parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 7.  
Rank Dependant  Utility Parameter Estimates 
 Pooled Regression Risky Gambles Safe Gambles 
Parameter r -0.035** (0.003) 
-0.032** 
(0.003) 
-0.049** 
(0.003) 
Parameter b -1.184** (0.154) 
-1.169** 
(0.154) 
0.33* 
(0.193) 
Adjusted R2 0.826 0.784 0.899 
Number of Obs. 1920 960 960 
Note 
The sign ** Indicates significant at 5% level; * Indicates significance at 10% level; standard errors are in 
parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 8.  
Rank Dependant Utility With Sample Split Along Royalty Rates 
 0% Royalty 5% Royalty 20% Royalty 
Parameter ri 
-0.022** 
(0.007) 
-0.030** 
(0.003) 
-0.065** 
(0.004) 
Parameter b -1.113** (0.247) 
-1.120** 
(0.220) 
-1.121** 
(0.224) 
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.833 0.829 
Number of Obs. 640 640 640 
Notes 
The sign ** Indicates significant at 5% level; * Indicates significance at 10% level; standard errors are in 
parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 9. 
Expected Utility (CRRA) Parameter Estimates: Female vs. Male 
 Female Male 
Parameter r -0.029** (0.003) 
-0.046** 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.8611 0.8885 
Number of Obs. 
 
1120 
 
900 
Note 
The indication ** means the estimate is significant at 5% level while * indicates significance at 
10% level; standard errors are in parentheses below the parameters. 
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Table 10.  
Rank Dependant Utility Model: Female vs. Male. 
Parameter Female Male 
Parameter r -0.027** (0.003) 
-0.046** 
(0.003) 
Parameter b -1.131** (0.188) 
-1.240** 
(0.213) 
Obs. 
 
1120 
 
900 
Adjusted R2 0.8125 0.8422 
Note 
The indication ** means the estimate is significant at 5% level while * indicates significance 
at 10% level; standard errors are in parentheses below the parameters. 
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Figure 1: Difference between WTA and EV 5% Royalty 
 
Note 
K-density estimates of the subjects’ WTA. 
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Figure 2: Difference between WTA and EV 20% Royalty 
 
Note 
K-density estimates of the subjects’ WTA. 
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Figure 3: Difference between WTA and EV Safe vs. Risky 
 
Note 
K-density estimates of the subjects’ WTA. 
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Annex 2: Sample of Experimental Treatment  
Instructions  
Welcome 
Thank you for participating today! 
Please turn off your mobile phones. Please do not talk during the experiment and do your own 
work. Please raise your hand at any time if you have a question.  
What you will be doing 
You will make several decisions involving lotteries today.  The results will depend on your 
decisions and chance.  You will be paid in cash according to the results of one of your choices at 
the end of the experiment.   All of your decisions will be anonymous. 
Describing the lotteries  
In each question you will be given a lottery.  This means that at the beginning of each question, 
you own the lottery and if nothing changes you may play it for cash.       
A lottery is represented by a pie chart. The area filled in by each shade in the chart, dark or light, 
represents a different outcome.  Each outcome is an amount of money that is paid in cash if the 
outcome occurs. The size of the dark and light zones represents the chances of the outcome 
occurring. The larger the zone, the more likely the outcome.  
Please look at the example below and make sure that it is clear. 
   
 
In this example, the larger dark zone represents a 70 in 100 chance of winning $12. And the 
smaller light zone represents 30 in 100 chances of winning $30.  
 
30 Chances  
in 100 
70 Chances  
in 100 
$12 
$30 
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The decisions you will make: 
At the start of each question you will be given a lottery.  This means that at the start of each 
question you own the right to play the lottery for cash.  
In the first type of task you will decide the minimum amount of money that you are willing to 
accept in exchange for the lottery.   
The first type of decision 
Please look at the following example: 
 
=$  X 
In this example the decision maker receives a lottery with a 30 in 100 chance of winning $30 and 
a 70 in 100 chance of winning $12.  
The task is to report the minimum amount of money that would be acceptable in exchange for the 
lottery and to record it in the place of the letter X.  If the exchange were to be made the decision 
maker would then own the cash and none of the lottery. 
Receiving an amount larger than or equal to the amount reported would be acceptable to make the 
exchange of the amount for the lottery. Receiving an amount smaller than the amount reported 
would be unacceptable to make the exchange between the amount and the lottery.  
In the second type of task you will decide the minimum amount of money that you are willing to 
accept in exchange for part of the lottery.  After the exchange you still own a portion of the 
lottery.   
The second type of decision 
Please look at the following example: 
30 Chances  
in 100 
70 Chances  
in 100 
$12 
$30 
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The Small Pie is 5% of the original 
one. 
 
=$..X    +  
In this example the decision maker receives a lottery with a 50 in 100 chance of winning $12 and 
a 50 in 100 chance of winning $30.  
The task is to report the minimum amount that would be acceptable in exchange for 95% of the 
lottery and to record it in the place of the letter X.  If the exchange were to be made the decision 
maker would own the cash and 5% of the lottery.  5% of the lottery is 5% of the payoffs.  In this 
case, this would be 50 in 100 chance of winning $1.50 and a 50 in 100 chance of winning $0.60. 
Receiving an amount larger than or equal to the amount reported would be acceptable to make the 
exchange of the amount for the lottery.  Receiving an amount smaller than the amount reported 
would be unacceptable to make the exchange between the amount and the lottery.  
 
The decision booklet 
The booklet containing your decisions has been placed on your desk upside-down.  You will 
make your decisions one page at a time. 
(1) After the instructions are completed, turn over the top page of the booklet. 
(2) Record your responses on the page. 
(3) When finished, turn the page upside-down and raise your hand. 
(4) An experimenter will collect your page, leaving it upside down and place it on the desk in 
the middle of the room. 
(5) Turn over the next page and repeat this procedure. 
 
Determining your earnings 
After entering all of your decisions onto the decision sheets, there are two steps to determine your 
earnings. 
 
(1) One randomly selected decision 
50% 50% 
50 Chances  
in 100 
50 Chances  
in 100 
$30 
$12 
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First a computer will randomly determine which decision you will be paid for.  Every decision 
has the same chances of being selected for pay.   
 
Since every decision has the same chances of being chosen:  every decision you make is equally 
important for your final earnings. 
 
Second. a number will be drawn by a computer to determine whether you play the lottery or 
exchange it for cash. The number will be in dollars and cents from 0.00 to 50.00.  Every number 
from 0.00 to 50.00 will have the same chance of being drawn. 
(2) Determining whether to make the exchange 
 
(1) If the number drawn is equal to or smaller than the number you reported as your 
maximum willingness to accept for your lottery then you keep the lottery and play it for 
pay.   
 
(2) If the number drawn is larger than the number you reported then you exchange your 
lottery for the amount that was drawn and in some cases part of the lottery. 
 
It is in your best interest to report your true willingness to pay to exchange lotteries. 
 
This procedure is complicated but the computer uses this procedure simply so that it is in your 
best interest to report your true minimum willingness to accept to make the exchange.   
 
Think of the procedure as working this way.  You state a minimum asking price for your lottery 
say $100.  If someone says “I’ll give you $75 for it” you would reply “no thanks”.  But if 
someone says “I’ll give you $110 for it” you would reply “It’s a deal”.  That is precisely how this 
procedure works. 
It may seem as though it may be worth it to under-state your willingness to accept for an 
exchange but in reality doing so can only hurt you.   Here are some examples that explain why it 
can only hurt you to misreport your true valuation of the exchange. 
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For example imagine that your minimum willingness to accept to make the exchange is 
$20 but you report $10.   
Under-reporting willingness to accept: 
If the number drawn is between $10 and $20 say $15 you receive $15 and make the 
exchange.  
Since you would have preferred to keep the lottery (you were willing to accept at least 
$20) reporting a lower willingness to pay was a mistake. 
 
For a second example imagine that your minimum willingness to accept to exchange 
lotteries is $20 but you report $25.   
Over-reporting willingness to accept: 
If the number drawn is between $20 and $25 say $23 you keep the lottery and do not 
make the exchange.   
Since you would have preferred to make the exchange (you were willing to accept at least 
$20) reporting a higher willingness to accept was a mistake. 
Summary of your earnings 
First one of your decisions will be selected to determine your earnings.  All of your decisions 
have an equal chance of being selected.  All of your decisions are equally important for your 
earnings. 
Second the random number will be drawn to determine whether or not the exchange is made.  It is 
in your best interest to report your true minimum amount of money you are willing to accept for 
each lottery. 
You will either receive the lottery the cash or the cash and a portion of the lottery depending on 
the decision that is chosen for pay. 
Collecting your earnings 
After you have completed all the pages in your booklet please raise your hand.  An experimenter 
will return all of your pages to you and instruct you where to go to collect your payment. 
The specific response for which you are paid and the random number that is drawn to determine 
whether you keep the lottery will be determined by the computer at the payment station.   
If you play the lottery for pay the outcome will be determined by drawing a coloured chip out of a 
bag. 
Are there any questions? 
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Quiz 
Please answer every question and then raise your hand when you are finished. 
 
For the questions on this page imagine that you are presented with Figure A to make your 
decisions in the experiment. 
 
                                   Figure A. 
 
1. What do you have before you make your decision?  How many chances do you have to win 
how much money? 
2.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $25.  What do you now have? 
3.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $35.  What do you now have? 
4.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $30.  What do you now have? 
 
For the questions on this page imagine that you are presented with Figure B to make your 
decisions in the experiment. 
30  
 
   70 
$10 
$28 
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The Small Pie is 5% of the original 
one. 
 
=$......  +  
                                                              Figure B. 
 
5. What do you have before you make your decision?  How many chances do you have to win 
how much money? 
6.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $25.  What do you now have? 
7.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $35.  What do you now have? 
8.  Imagine that you report your minimum willingness to accept for this lottery is $30 and then the 
number that is drawn is $30.  What do you now have? 
For the following question think of all the decisions you will make in this session. 
9.  Which decision or decisions will you be paid for and when? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50% 50%            50   
 
50   
$10 
$28 
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Sample of the Decision-sheets 
 
Date:                                     ID: 
The pie in each row of the figure below represents a lottery that you own.  You are asked to state the minimum amount of money 
you are willing to accept for it. Please write down your response in the empty box next to the $. The light zone represents the chances 
of winning $40 and the dark zone represents the chances of winning $1. 
 
 
 
=$ 
 
 
 
=$ 
 
 
 
=$ 
 
=$ 
 
 
=$ 
Table 10 
90 Chances  
in 100 
10 Chances  
in 100 
$1 $40 
30 Chances  
in 100 
70 Chances  
in 100 
$1 
$40 
50 Chances  
in 100 
50 Chances  
in 100 
$40 
$1 
70 Chances  
in 100 
30 Chances  
in 100 
$1 
$40 
90 Chances  
in 100 
10 Chances  
in 100  
$40 
$1 
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Date:                                     ID: 
The pie in each row of the figure below represents a lottery that you own.  You are asked to state the 
minimum amount of money you are willing to accept for 80% of it (you will be left with 20% of the 
original lottery). Please write down your response in the empty box next to the $. The light zone represents 
the chances of winning $40 and the dark zone represents the chances of winning $1. 
 
 
 
 
=$...................
+ 
111 
11 
 
 
 
 
=$...................
+ 
 
111 
00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=$...................
+ 
 
111 
11 
 
 
50% 50% 
50 Chances  
in 100 
50 Chances  
in 100 $1 
$40 
70% 
30% 
70 Chances  
in 100 
30 Chances  
in 100 
$1 
$40 
90% 
10% 
90 Chances  
in 100 
10 Chances  
in 100  
$40 
$1 
50 
 
 
 
=$...................
+ 
 
111 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
=$...................
+ 
 
111 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
The inscription on the back of each sheet 
1. Please write your ID in the box at the top of every
2. When you have finished answering the questions of this sheet raise your 
hand and wait for the experimenter to pick up the sheet 
 sheet. 
then
 
 move to the 
next sheet. 
 
 
 
10% 
90% 
90 Chances  
in 100 
10 Chances  
in 100 
$1 $40 
30% 
70% 
30 Chances  
in 100 
70 Chances  
in 100 
$1 
$40 
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I. Introduction 
            Social scientists since Max Weber have been interested in the role of religion in 
shaping individual agents' incentives and behaviours and from there socioeconomic 
organization of a society. Some contemporary scholars have focused on the impact of 
religion through the channel of social institutions and aggregate outcomes1, while others 
have examined this impact through the channel of individual behaviours2
            There are various theories as to why religiosity should affect wages. One, first 
stated by Becker and Tomes (1979), is that religiosity, along with certain other attributes 
including socioeconomic status, passes on from parents to children. Religious 
denomination and the degree of religiosity are highly correlated among generations
. In this paper, I 
contribute to the latter literature by studying the link between religiosity and wages in 
Canada, including the differential effects of religiosity by religious denomination. I also 
examine inter-denomination wage gap and human capital return differences. 
3
            Also since religious groups have been studied as social clubs (Iannaccone 1992), 
it is possible to conceive of a relationship between religiosity and earnings through this 
channel: collective religious practice can increase an agent’s social links and from there 
.  
Children also inherit their parents’ social network and financial means which affect 
children’s wage. These two channels can lead to a correlation between religious 
affiliations or the degree of religiosity and earnings.  
                                                          
1 See: Dudley and Blum 2001; McCleary and Barro 2003; Durlauf et al.  2006; Guiso 2003; Boppart et al. 
2008. 
2 Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Ehrenberg 1977, Long and Settle 1977; Ulbrich and Wallace 1983 and 1984, 
and Biddle 1992; Iannaccone 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2004. 
3 In my data, among  respondents with a religious affiliation, more than 87% adhere to same faith as at least 
one of their parents and even among respondents of no religious affiliation more than 56% follow at least 
one of their parents in having no religious affiliation (see Tomes, 1985, for comparable statistics).  
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impact his or her earnings.  This channel may be especially relevant for the members of a 
minority religion. 
            Another suggestion is that religious individuals learn to be or are naturally 
disciplined, diligent, entrepreneurial and thrifty; values which would increase earnings4 
(Audretsch et al. 2007). A few recent experimental studies have found that religious 
individuals may also be more trusting, and therefore work more cooperatively, thereby 
implying that religiosity may have a positive effect on earnings5
            There may also be a link between religiosity and educational attainment, which 
implies a link with earnings. This correlation is found to be positive in the United States 
but the direction of causality is not clear and subject to debate
.  
6
            On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of a negative correlation between 
religiosity and earnings if religious individuals are also more risk-averse or conform more 
closely to inherited social values. The impact of a higher degree of risk-aversion and 
conformity on earnings depends on the society’s institutions and economic organisation, 
and it is ultimately an empirical question. There are studies that have found a negative 
correlation between an individual’s higher risk aversion and earnings
.  
7
                                                          
4 Audretsch et al. (2007) look at the enhancing impact of religion on the tendency towards entrepreneurship 
with data from India. Their results suggest that certain denominations’ tenets and teachings impact 
negatively the tendency towards entrepreneurship. 
5 Johansson-Stenman et al. 2006; Tan and Vogel 2006; Audretsch et al. 2007; Anderson et al.  2008. For 
the impact of trusting behaviour en economic attainment see: Arrow 1972; Zak and Knack 2001. Johnson-
Stenman 
6 Sacerdote and Glaeser 2001; Sander 2001; Blusch 2007. 
7 See for instance Heckman et al. 2006. 
. There are also 
studies that have linked religiosity to Intellectual Quotient (IQ). In a cross-country study, 
Lynn et al. (2009) find that IQ is negatively correlated with religiosity. Assuming a 
positive casual relationship between IQ and labour market outcomes, one can also 
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conceive of a relationship between religiosity and earnings (for emotional intelligence 
quotient, see Len et. al 2002). 
            Differences in religious denominations in a given society can also overlap with the 
racial differences present in this society.  Reitz et al.  (2009)  find that between race and 
religious denomination it is the former factor which has higher importance in explaining 
the observed labour market attainment gap among groups. 
            In some countries certain religious denominations are composed of mostly 
immigrants and the immigrant status can explain a number of variables and outcomes 
important in labour market. Canadian immigration policy and its requirements concerning 
immigrants’ education may cause correlations between specific labour market outcomes 
and a religious affiliation with a high share of immigrants in their population. Also, since 
foreign labour market experience can be a poor substitute for Canadian labour market 
experience or its value may be unrecognized by Canadian employers8, immigration might 
be behind a given religious afflation’s lower attainment in the Canadian labour market.9
                                                          
8 Finnie and Meng 2002.   
9 The socioeconomic impact of not adhering to the majority religion (Christianity) in Canada and the United 
Kingdom is the subject of a study by Model and Lin (2002).   
.  
            The link between religiosity and earnings may vary by religion. This variation 
may be because religions inculcate different values which are present more strongly in the 
more religious or because the selection of individuals into higher degrees of religiosity 
varies by religion. The implication in either case is that average earnings may also vary 
by religion, even controlling for observable characteristics. Examples of such values 
include attitudes towards education or towards family size as well as trust and 
cooperation. 
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            The empirical papers examining wage gap among religious groups, regardless of 
degree of religiosity, find that Jews have higher earnings in the United States10
            Jews are usually found to have a higher education as well. It has been proposed 
due to their past history of the expropriation of material wealth Jews make greater 
investments in human capital which is embodied and transportable. The higher earnings 
of Jews have also been explained through their low fertility levels influencing parental 
investments in their children in contrast with Roman Catholics (and their religious 
disapproval of birth control resulting in larger family size and lower investments in each 
child’s education)
. In 
Canada, Tomes (1983, 1984 and 1985) and Meng and Sentance (1984), using data from 
1970s, find that Jews earn more than Catholics and Protestants conditional on observed 
characteristics.   
11
                                                          
10 Steen 1996; Chiswick 1983 and 1985; Chiswick and Huang 2006.  
11 Brenner and Kiefer 1981; Becker 1981; Tomes, 1984.   
. 
            I contribute to this literature in various ways. My paper is the first to use a 
composite, score-based index standing for the degree of religiosity instead of a single 
survey question or unique observable indicator. Second, this paper is the first to consider 
the interaction of the degree of religiosity and religious denomination in a human capital-
earnings equation.  Third, I update older papers which used Canadian data to examine 
inter-denomination wage gap. Fourth, I consider both men and women, which previous 
Canadian papers did not do. Fifth, this study is the first on a high income country to 
consider Muslims as a distinct religious group.  Sixth, I consider the interaction of the 
effects of religion and of immigration. I use the Ethnic Diversity Survey for my study 
given its questions on the respondents’ religious affiliation and the extent of religiosity.  
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            I find that higher religiosity is associated with lower earnings on average; one 
standard deviation increase in religiosity reduces earnings by 2.3%. This finding contrasts 
with results for the United States where the correlation is found to be positive. The 
component of religiosity that has the strongest effect is the indicator standing for the self-
reported importance of religion. When I consider the effect of religiosity by religion, I 
find that the effect is largest for Jews (and next largest for Catholics). I find that Muslims 
have lower mean earnings than other denominations and no return to experience. The 
latter result is explained by the low return to experience for immigrants to Canada in 
general and the high share of immigrants among Muslims. Compared to earlier studies of 
Canada, my results indicate that the earnings gap for Protestants and Catholics has 
disappeared, but that Jews' higher mean earnings and higher return to experience remain. 
II. Data  
            The dataset used in this study is Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) of Statistics 
Canada conducted between April and August 2002. The dataset is a survey of 41695 
respondents of 15 years old and above, male or female legal residents of Canada. The 
advantage of this survey over labour market surveys is that it contains specific 
information about the self-reported importance of religion and the frequency of religious 
practice. The variables used in this paper are listed in Table 1 and the descriptive statistics 
are in Table 2. All reported statistics and estimation are computed using survey weights. 
            The subsample I use is the one of working respondents. EDS contains data on 
yearly labour earnings in Canadian dollars as well as hours worked on a weekly basis and 
weeks worked per year. The dependant variable, natural logarithm of hourly wage, has 
been created using this data. Education measured by the highest degree attained by the 
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respondents as well as that of their parents and their spouses (if applicable) is also 
surveyed. 
            As reported in Table 3, self-reported Catholics constitute 42% of the sample 
followed by Protestants with 25 % and by the respondents of no religious affiliation 
(including but not limited to atheists12
            In the EDS the respondents are asked to express their opinion about the 
importance of religion by ranking it from 5 to 1, where 5 stands for very important and 1 
for not important at all. There are two other questions dealing with religiosity and 
religious activity of the respondents. In one question, the respondents are asked to choose 
among different options the one that corresponds to their own frequency of religious 
practice with a group of people of the same faith. The other question asks about the 
frequency of individual religious practice. For both questions the options are: at least once 
a week, once a month, at least three times a year, once or twice a year and not at all, 
taking the values of 5 to 1. In these questions of the survey “Not applicable” is also a 
) with 17%. Among the minority religions, Judaism 
and Islam are close to each other in terms of the percentage of the devotees with slightly 
higher than 1% and slightly lower than 2% respectively. The average age of working 
Muslims (38 years old) is lower, while the average age of working Jews is noticeably 
higher (45 years old) than average working Canadian (41 years old). The percentage 
shares of immigrants in the religious groups, reported in the last column, is the highest for 
Muslims (95%) and the lowest for Protestants (14%).  
                                                          
12 Note that it may be difficult to distinguish between sects and groups of philosophical thoughts and some 
religions in the absence of a clear definition of religion. The variable “no religious affiliation” defined in 
Table-2 explains how this distinction is made in the EDS. It is interesting to note that this way of 
distinguishing between having a religious affiliation and not having a religious affiliation is in accordance 
with the definition proposed by Iannaccone (1998). He defines religion as “any shared set of beliefs, 
activities, and institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces”. His definition, he points out, 
excludes purely individualistic spirituality and systems of metaphysical thoughts including some variants of 
Buddhism. 
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response which is attributed to the respondents of no religious affiliation. I quantified this 
response by setting its value equal to zero.  
            For the sake of having a comprehensive measure of religiosity, an index can be 
defined by summing the ranking numbers of the answers to the three aforementioned 
questions. Note that in the first question, the respondents had to rank the importance of 
religion from 1 to 5 while in the two others the respondents’ answers were on the 
frequency of their individual and collective religious practice bound by 5 predetermined 
categories. Therefore the index varies between 0 and 15. 
     Note that, this religiosity is not grounded in a theoretical framework. However, it is the 
most comprehensive indicator of an individual’s valuation for religion given the available 
data in the current datasets. Moreover, an almost identical religiosity index is suggested 
by Statistics Canada. According to Statistics Canada, The four dimensions of religiosity, 
affiliation, attendance, personal practices and importance of religion-can be combined 
into a simple "religiosity index" constructed a manner similar to mine. A relatively high 
score on this index (very religious person) indicates that the individual attends religious 
services at least once a week, engages in personal religious practices at least once a week, 
and places a great deal of importance on religion (See: Clark and Schellenberg 2006). 
            The problematic issue in the construction of this religiosity index is that the 
passage from one category to the next in the questions regarding the incidence of 
religious practice does not signify the same distance in a quantitative way.  More 
precisely, in the first category the reported incidence of religious practice is at least 52 
times a year while in the second it falls to at least 12 times, and to 3 times in the third. 
Therefore the predetermined survey categories do not consistently map to a measure 
proportionate to the respondents’ yearly frequency of religious practice.  
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            It may be argued that any non-linear translation of categories into a quantitative 
measure has the disadvantage of arbitrariness. A sensible translation of surveys’ 
predetermined categories of religious practice is used by William Sander (2002). He maps 
the predetermined General Social Survey categories to a quantitative measure as follows: 
never equals 0, less than once a year equals 0.5, about once or twice a year equals 1, 
several times a year equals 3, about once a month equals 12, two to three times per month 
equals 30, nearly every week equals 40, every week or more often equals 52.  
            I opt for both an unscaled religiosity index by summing the ranking number of the 
respondents to the above mentioned religion-related questions of the EDS and an index 
constructed in consistency with William Sander’s translation of the predetermined 
categories into magnitudes proportionate to yearly frequencies (called scaled religiosity 
index). The scaled religiosity index is normalized to 15 and when the value of 0 is 
attributed to the respondents who have no religious affiliation, both indices have the same 
range (from 0 to 15). The scaling done, however, does not entirely solve the problem of 
the ordinal nature of the religiosity index, because unlike the two questions on the 
frequency of religious practice, no natural scale can be defined for the question about the 
importance of religion. 
            The average score of the unscaled index and scaled index is 7.7 and 5.7 
respectively. Muslims rank first among the religious denominations both in the scaled and 
unscaled religiosity index, while Protestants’ indices are the lowest among the groups. I 
report the means of the indices and their components in Table 4. 
            Descriptive statistics on the relationship between religious denomination and 
hourly earnings as well as educational attainment are reported in Table 5. The statistics 
suggest sizable differences among religious groups.  Working Jewish males earn 26% 
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more than average working Canadian males, while working Muslims earn 13% less than 
the average Canadian and working Muslim males earn 15% less than the average working 
Canadian males13
                                                          
13 Tomes (1985) noted that in Canada taking into account the Jewish female side of labour market may 
make a substantial difference especially with respect to Jewish earnings i.e. Jewish females, he suggested, 
earned less than average Canadian female to the point that it could more than compensate the Jewish males’ 
premium. The ratio of male to female earnings is currently the highest among Jews (ratio of mean hourly 
wages in Canadian dollars: 29/22≈1.3) while Muslims come second (ratio of mean hourly wages in 
Canadian dollars: 20/17≈1.2). The Canadian average wage ratio is approximately 1.1. 
.  
            Jews enjoy a higher level of education evident from both average years of 
schooling and the percentage of their population that holds a university (college) degree.  
Working Jews have on average close to 2 more years of schooling and 51% of them hold 
a university (college) degree against 23% of all working Canadians. Muslims also have 
on average 1.3 more years of schooling and their university graduate percentage is higher 
than the average by close to 20 percentage points. It is noteworthy that unlike in previous 
studies dating back to 1980s, Catholics now have the same educational attainment as 
Protestants (see Tomes 1984). 
            There are a number of other variables that I use as extra controls in my 
estimations of Mincerian wage regression augmented by religiosity indicators (Mincer 
1974). The location of the respondents’ residence is controlled for (these locations are 
Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver, other Metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas). A 
dummy variable is included to control for self-employment. Another dummy variable is 
included to control for the respondents’ presence or lack of social trust. A proxy for social 
networking is used which equals the number of social clubs the respondents take part in. 
Marital status, belonging to visible minority groups, being a non-native speaker and 
gender are controlled for as well.  
61 
 
III. Methodology  
            The equation set for uncovering the relationship between religiosity, measured 
using the score-based religiosity index, and earnings, measured by natural logarithm of 
hourly wage, can be expressed as follows: 
ln(wage)= 𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 Schooling+ 𝛽𝛽2 Experience +𝛽𝛽3  Experience2  + ?⃗?𝑋𝛽𝛽 + δ Religiosity 
Indicator + ε                                                                                                                      (1) 
where ?⃗?𝑋  contains education in years, experience, experience squared, parents’ education 
and dummies for female, marital status, interaction of female and marital status,  
immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social 
networking proxy and locations.  The religiosity indicators are either the scaled or the 
unscaled religiosity index or their components accounted for separately. 
            To compare mean labour market performance of religions as groups, dummies 
designating each denomination are used as expressed in the equation below: 
ln(wage)= 𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 Schooling+ 𝛽𝛽2 Experience +𝛽𝛽3  Experience2  + ?⃗?𝑋𝛽𝛽 +∑ (𝛿𝛿0𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖5𝑖𝑖=1 )   + ε;       
i=1,...,5                                                                                                                            (2) 
where dummy variables I1 to I5 designate each denomination (Catholic, Protestant, Jew, 
Muslim and Other) by taking the value of 1 for the devotees of each religion and 0 
otherwise. The omitted category is the group of respondents of no religious affiliation. 
            In order to investigate whether the relationship between the degree of religiosity 
and earnings differs across religions, I estimate the equation below: 
ln(wage)= 𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 Schooling+ 𝛽𝛽2 Experience +𝛽𝛽3  Experience2  + ?⃗?𝑋𝛽𝛽 +∑ (𝛿𝛿0𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 +5𝑖𝑖=1
𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + ε;        i=1,...,5.                                                             (3) 
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             I am also interested in examining the differences in return to human capital 
variables. An equation in which the returns to education and labour market experience 
have varied slopes depending on religious affiliation can be written as follows: 
ln(wage)= ∑ (𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖  6𝑖𝑖=1 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  +𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖Schooling×𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖Experience×𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  +𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖Experience2×𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)+ ?⃗?𝑋𝛽𝛽 + 
ε;    i=1,...,6                                                                                                                    (4) 
            In order to complete the analysis of the wage gap among religious groups, the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique is used (Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 1973). Suppose 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) is the mean wage outcome of the groups of respondents of no religious 
affiliation and  𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖� is that of the denomination i (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,5). If we are interested in 
decomposing the wage gap between the respondents of no religious affiliation and 
religious group 𝑖𝑖, denoting the gap by 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 , we have: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖� = �𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)�′ × 𝛽𝛽∗ + [𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)′  × (𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝛽𝛽∗)] +
�𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)′  × �𝛽𝛽∗ − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�� = 𝐸𝐸 + 𝑈𝑈                                                                                           (5)                
            In Equation (5) 𝛽𝛽∗  is the vector of non-discriminatory coefficients of the wage 
equation. The component 𝐸𝐸 = �𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖��′ × 𝛽𝛽∗, called “Explained” in the 
literature, captures the contribution of the covariates (endowments) and the intercept to  
the wage gap while the component 𝑈𝑈 = [𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)′  × (𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝛽𝛽∗)] +  𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)′  × (𝛽𝛽∗ −
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖), called “Unexplained”, captures the contribution of the coefficients of the two groups’ 
underlying wage function to the wage gap given the vector of non-discriminatory 
coefficients plus the impact of unobservable factors. 
            Usually the vector of non-discriminatory coefficients, 𝛽𝛽∗, is estimated as a 
weighted average of the two groups using the same data. One special case, called the two-
fold decomposition, assigns the weight of 1 to one group and 0 to the other (Oaxaca, 
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1973). It means taking the coefficients of one of the two groups as the non-discriminatory 
one. Obviously the results of the decomposition are sensitive to the choice of the non-
discriminatory coefficients. This way of decomposing the wage gap is prominent in 
discrimination literature and it is the approach taken in this paper. I compare the five 
religious groups with the respondents of non-religious affiliation so 𝛽𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁  (for other 
proposed weight matrices see Reimers 1983, Cotton 1988, Neumark 1988 and Oaxaca 
and Ransom 1998). The equation behind the wage gap as estimated in this paper can be 
then written as follows: 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖� = �𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖��′ × 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁+ 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)′  × �𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�     (6)      
            As noted by Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), an identification problem arises when 
the decomposition results are broken into their individual components if dummy variables 
are included in the equation or when a variable has no natural zero point so that its 
magnitude is sensitive to the scaling chosen by the researcher  (see: Jones and Kelley 
1984). The standard methodology produces arbitrary results for the individual 
contributions of dummy and categorical variables as well as the constant to the 
unexplained portion of the decomposition results depending on the omitted category (in 
case of dummies) and the scaling choice (in case of variables without natural zero point). 
However magnitude of the aggregate components as well as the relative contributions of 
the components of explained part remains intact.  
            A solution to the arbitrariness problem caused by variables with no natural zero 
point has been proposed by Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004). The idea is to restrict the 
coefficients for the single categories to sum to zero which means expressing the effects as 
deviations from the sample average. Yun (2005) proposes a solution to the problem of 
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dummy variables that relies on averaging out the results obtained from all possible 
choices of omitted categories. Thus a more convenient way to deal with variables with no 
natural zero point is also to estimate the group models using the usual dummy coding and 
then apply the solution proposed for the case of the presence of dummies by Yun (2005). 
In this paper, given the presence of a set of dummies and a variable in the estimated 
equations that has no natural zero point (Trusting behaviour), the methodology proposed 
by Yun (implemented in STATA by Jann, 2008) is applied. Two specifications, one 
reduced (including a smaller set of dummy variables) and another including all of the 
regressors are used for the wage gap decomposition.  
             The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition estimates are reported for individual 
covariates and coefficients as well as their aggregate level in form of aforementioned 
Explained (E) and Unexplained (U) components. The reported sampling variance of the 
decomposition results are computed following the formula proposed by Jann (2005) 
producing consistent estimates for the population values of variances. This formula 
differs from the one proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) and the comparable one 
proposed by Greene (2003) in adjusting for the fact that the mean covariates used in the 
decomposition, 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖� and 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁), are replaced by their sample averages so they are 
themselves estimators. To correct for this the standard errors are divided by the degrees of 
freedom 𝑁𝑁 × (𝑁𝑁 − 1). All the equations are estimated by OLS. 
IV. Results  
            Table 6 shows a set of the regressions in which extra explanatory variables are 
gradually added starting with the unique regressor of unscaled religiosity index in the first 
column to the full set of explanatory variables in the fifth column.  Recall that the 
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religiosity index ranges from the value of 0 (for respondents of no religious affiliation) to 
15 with the standard deviation of 5.2. The coefficient of religiosity index whose value is 
multiplied by 10 is reported in the first column of Table 6. It implies that an increase of 
one standard deviation in religiosity index is associated with a decline in hourly wage of 
2.3%. The impact implied by the coefficient reported in the last column of Table 6 (the 
estimation incorporating the full set of regressors) reaches 3.0%. This result contrasts 
with the pattern uncovered in the United States where the impact of religiosity is 
generally found to be positive (Iannaconne 1998).  
            No definitive explanation can be provided for this discrepancy between Canada 
and the United States in the absence of comparative research. One possible reason can be 
the religious market structure. It is recognized that in the United States the religious 
market is very competitive: churches, synagogues and new religions compete for devotees 
(see Iannaccone 1992a and 1995). This competition positively impacts the quality of 
religious products attracting the portions of the population that would have probably 
given up religious affiliation in the absence of this quality amelioration.  If the 
consequence of this market structure is a targeted attempt to attract the more affluent part 
of United States’ population towards religion (motivated by their potential financial 
contribution) then this discrepancy in the sign of the relationship between the US and 
Canada can be explained.  
            In Table 7 I explore the relative contribution of the components of the religiosity 
index and the sensitivity of the results to the scaling of the index. The left panel reports 
regressions incorporating unscaled religiosity indicators (column 1 and 2) and the right 
panel includes the regressions having the scaled religiosity indicators as explanatory 
variables (columns 3 to 7). The first regression reported in the column (1) is the same as 
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the one reported in the last column of Table 5. In the regression in column (2) each of the 
components of the religiosity index are included separately. The results reported in 
column (2) show that much of the negative relationship between religiosity and earnings 
is captured by the indicator standing for the self-reported importance of religion to the 
respondent (the variable Importance of religion). Collective religious practice, by 
contrast, has a positive sign. All of the coefficients controlled for are statistically 
significantly different from each other at 10% level.  
            In the third column the results of a regression in which the scaled religiosity index 
is used are reported. All else equal, one standard deviation change in scaled religiosity 
index lowers the hourly wage by 2.6 percent while the impact of unscaled religiosity 
index amounts to 3.0 percent. 
             When the scaled religiosity index is decomposed in column (4) of this table, the 
qualitative conclusions remain the same as the column (2). However, the coefficient on 
collective religious practice loses its statistical significance. The coefficients on the 
importance of religion and individual religious practice are statistically significantly 
different from each other only at 20% level.  All else equal, a standard deviation change 
in the three components of the unscaled religiosity index, importance of religion, 
individual religious practice and collective religious practice,  affects hourly wage by -2.3 
percent, -1.4 percent and 0.3 percent respectively. 
            Finally, the components of religiosity index (scaled version) are added one at a 
time to the regressions. The results of these three regressions are reported in columns (5), 
(6) and (7).  All of the coefficients turn out to be statistically significant and negative. The 
effect of one standard deviation change in importance of religion, collective religious 
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practice and individual religious practice on hourly wage is computed to be -3.3%, -2.1% 
and -2.8 % respectively. 
            The results reported in Table 7 indicate that the impact of religiosity on earnings is 
better predicted by the individuals’ set of beliefs rather than by their behaviour. The 
variable Importance of religion can be taken as a proxy for the unobservable belief while 
the two other religiosity indicators are behavioural. The stronger negative correlation of 
the variable Importance of religion may indicate that the relationship between religiosity 
and labour market outcomes can be better understood looking at an individual’s 
personality traits.  
            In Table 8 the results obtained by the estimation of the equations (2) and (3) are 
reported. In the upper panel of Table 8 it becomes clear that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the base group (respondents of no religious affiliation) and 
Jews or Protestants. Muslims earn close to 15% less than the reference group while 
Catholics earn around 4% less all else equal. 
            In the lower panels of Table 8 the results obtained by the estimation of the 
equation (3) are reported. These results show how the degree of religiosity affects 
individuals within their own religious denomination. The degree of religiosity does not 
significantly affect earnings of Muslims and Protestants within their own group. 
However, for the groups of Jews, Catholics and Other, higher degrees of religiosity are 
associated with a negative impact on earnings, with a much more important magnitude in 
for Jews. 
            Equation (3) as well as the equation (1) are based on the assumption that the 
relationship between the degree of religiosity and earnings is monotonic.  Chiswick and 
Huang (2006) found that the impact of synagogue attendance is not monotonic in an 
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equation for Jewish males’ earnings in the United States. I tested such a hypothesis by 
using dummy variables for each value of the religiosity indicators; however, the 
regressions did not lead to statistically significant coefficients suggesting linearly 
accounting for religiosity indicators is more fruitful.  
            Table 9 displays the tabulation of F-statistics for the coefficients of religiosity 
indicators across the columns in Table 8. When the impact of religiosity is accounted for 
additively (the upper panel in Table 8), the difference between Muslims and all other 
groups is statistically significantly different from zero. The same applies to the group 
“Other”. With respect to the regression to uncover the impact of the degree of religiosity 
(lower panels in Table 8) the differences between the coefficients obtained for Jews and 
for Catholics with other groups are statistically significantly different from zero. 
            Turning to the question of the cross-religion differential in human capital return, 
equation (4) is the basis of estimation whose results are reported in Table 10. This 
equation allows the coefficients on human capital variables (education, experience and 
experience squared) to vary with religious affiliation. The results show that there is no 
significant difference in the return to education among the religious groups under 
consideration. My results suggest that there is a sizable statistically significant difference 
between the return to experience of Jews and of Muslims and other groups.   
            The experience-earnings profile of Jews is steeper than other groups while 
experience turns out to have no economically and statistically significant impact on the 
Muslims’ earnings.  An illustration of the results presented in Table 10 is provided by 
Figure 1 and the marginal return to experience for its three different levels (5, 10, 20 
years) is computed and reported in Table 11.  
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            The higher return to experience for Jews found in my study is in conformity with 
previously published results for Canadian and American labour markets.  However, to my 
knowledge, it is the first time Muslims are accounted for in such study. The fact that a 
very high proportion of Muslims are immigrants and given that the return to foreign 
experience is practically zero in Canada may partially explain the lack of return to 
experience for Muslims (see Finnie and Meng, 2002). This hypothesis is investigated by 
allowing the return to immigrant human capital variables to differ from natives. The 
results are reported in Table 12 and Table 13 and Figure 2 illustrates these results. By 
allowing the return to immigrant experience to be different, the gap between Muslims and 
other groups appreciably lessens: the native Muslims earnings-experience profile is 
similar to that of other denominations and the differences are no longer statistically 
significantly different from zero except for the coefficient on the squared term of 
Protestants’ experience. At the same time, the Jewish positive gap with other groups is 
slightly wider when only natives are considered. 
            Tables 14 to 17 contain the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the 
mean wage gaps (the two-fold decomposition). The underlying model for Table 14 
(showing aggregate results) and Table 15 (showing the individual contributions of a 
selection of covariates) is the reduced equation that includes human capital variables and 
a restricted set of dummies as explanatory variables. As shown in Table 14, I find that 
when respondents of no religious affiliation are assumed to be the no discrimination 
group the largest wage gap in, absolute value, belongs to Jews (-0.186) and the second 
largest turns out to be that of Muslims (0.136). The highest statistically significant 
contribution of coefficients to the mean wage gap, denoted Unexplained in the tables, 
belongs to Muslims (85%) and the second largest contribution belongs to Other (71%). 
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Also, I find that the largest contribution of the explanatory variables to the mean wage 
gap, denoted Explained in the tables, belongs to Jews (69%). This point indicates that 
labour market treatment of Jews is the closest to that of the respondents of no religious 
affiliation among all the religious groups under consideration  
            Table 15 reports the contributions of education and experience (as well as the sum 
of the contributions of the remaining variables) to the mean wage gaps. Most components 
are statistically insignificant for both explained and unexplained portions. However 
education and the two terms of experience, except for Muslims and Other, remain 
statistically significant at 5% level for the explained portion. The contribution of 
experience is summed over its two terms when reported in Table 15 (and Table 17).  For 
the explained portion the results are in accordance with how the sample averages of the 
groups’ endowments compare to those of the group of no religious affiliation. Among the 
reported details for the explained portion, the largest contribution comes from education 
for Jews (-0.10 of a wage gap of -0.19) and then Muslims (-0.08 of a wage gap of 0.14). 
            In the unexplained portion, informative about the differences in the coefficients 
hence possible discrimination, education is found to be important in magnitude for most 
groups with a positive sign meaning less favourable treatments compared to the no 
discrimination group (no religious affiliation). The largest estimate belongs to Muslims 
(≈0.12 for a 0.14 overall wage gap) and the second largest belongs to Other (≈0.09  of a 
0.07 wage gap) while the smallest is the estimate for Jews (≈0.01  for a -0.19 overall wage 
gap). The estimates for the contribution of experience to the unexplained portion are close 
to each other in their magnitude for the groups of Protestant, Catholic and Other 
(approximately 0.07, 0.06 and 0.05; being 86, -129 and 70 percents of the overall wage 
gaps respectively). For Muslims as well, this estimate has a positive sign however it is 
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significantly larger (≈0.14 ; 100% of the wage gap being explained). For Jews, the 
estimate turns out to be relatively large but negative (≈-0.08; 42% of the wage gap being 
explained) meaning a better treatment compared to no discrimination group. From Table 
15 it becomes also clear that the magnitude of the contributions of education, in absolute 
value, is always lower than that of experience except for Other. 
            Table 16 and Table 17 report the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
(aggregate and detailed versions respectively) of the mean wage gap using the complete 
set of explanatory variables (called augmented equation). Using the whole set of 
explanatory variables leads to comparable conclusions as of the sign and the relative 
contributions of the explained and unexplained portions. It is however of note that with 
the augmented equation, the explained portion captures a higher percentage of the mean 
wage gap of Jews (98% against 69%). The reverse is found for Muslims where the 
contribution of unexplained portion to the mean wage gap increases from 85% for the 
reduced equation to 94% with the augmented equation (see Table 16).  
            The individual contributions of a number of covariates, estimated using the 
augmented equation, are reported in Table 17. Here too, most estimates are statistically 
insignificant at an individual level while education and both terms of experience (except 
for Muslims and Other) remain statistically significant at 5% level for the explained 
portion. With the augmented equation the magnitude of the contribution of education to 
the unexplained portion increases in absolute value for all groups except for Jews while 
the largest and the second largest estimates remaining those of Muslims (≈0.13  for a 0.14 
overall wage gap) and Other (≈0.10  for a 0.07 wage gap). For Jews the sign of the 
estimate changes to negative, meaning a better treatment compared to the no 
discrimination group, with a relatively large magnitude (≈ -0.08 for a -0.19 overall wage 
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gap).  The estimates for the contribution of experience fall, in absolute value, for all 
groups compared to the results from the reduced equation. The largest fall belongs to 
Muslims (from 0.14 to 0.02).  
            Given the above-mentioned changes in the magnitudes of the contributions of 
education and experience in the unexplained portion, with the augmented equation, 
education becomes more important than experience for all groups, conversely to the 
reduced equation. Among the variables aggregated and reported in the columns Others 
the contribution of the variable Father’s education is the largest and statistically 
significant at around 15% level in both explained and unexplained portions. 
            Overall, these tables suggest that there may be some degree of discrimination in 
the Canadian labour market against Muslims as a group. However, this differentiated 
treatment cannot be explained by the single cause of religious affiliation as a variety of 
factors are simultaneously at work. Since the return to experience contributes 
significantly to the wage gap one is inclined to say that the immigrant status is the main 
reason behind Muslim’s lower earnings in Canada. 
V. Conclusion 
            Using the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey, I examined the relationship 
between religions, religiosity and earnings. With respect to the impact of overall 
religiosity on earnings, the relationship uncovered, although quantitatively not very large, 
is statistically significantly negative. This result contrasts with the results for the United 
States. For the first time, in this paper I have explicitly accounted for Muslims along with 
other religious groups previously examined in the Canadian context. The results show 
that their earnings are significantly lower than average, while Jews’ earnings are 
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significantly higher. More precisely, I found the experience-earnings profile of Jews is 
steeper than that of other denominations while Muslims’ return to experience is zero. The 
latter result is due to the higher share of immigrants among Muslims and the zero return 
to foreign experience of immigrants in Canada. 
             Further research can focus on providing an explanation for the higher return to 
experience for Jews. The ramifications of religiosity and religious denominations on other 
socioeconomic indicators such as education, cooperation, trust and risk-taking are also of 
interest. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Definition of Variable 
Variable Definition 
Unscaled religiosity 
index 
It is constructed as follows:  Religiosity Index= Importance of religion (between 0 and 5) 
+ Religious practice in group (between 0 and 5) + Individual religious practice (between 0 
and 5). 
 
Scaled  religiosity 
index 
It is constructed by summing the score of the importance of religion with the numbers 
obtained by modifying the degree of religious practice from their discrete categories to 
a number proportionate to the yearly frequency of practice.  
 
Importance of religion 
The EDS question is framed as: “Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not important at all 
and 5 is very important, how important your religion to you is?” The coverage of this 
question is Respondents who reported having a religion. "Not applicable" includes 
respondents who did not report having a religion. 
Religious practice in 
group 
 
The EDS question is framed as: “In the past 12 months, how often did you participate 
in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other 
than for events such as weddings and funerals?” Not applicable" includes respondents 
who did not report having a religion. 
Individual religious 
practice 
 
The EDS question is framed as: “In the past 12 months, how often did you do religious 
activities on your own? This may include prayer, meditation and other forms of 
worship taking place at home or in any other location.” Not applicable" includes 
respondents who did not report having a religion. 
 
Non metropolitan area 
Takes the value of 1 if the area of residence of the respondent is not a Census 
Metropolitan Area which is an area consisting of one or more adjacent municipalities 
situated around a major urban core. To form a census metropolitan area, the urban core 
must have a population of at least 100,000. 
 
Metropolitan area Dummy variables for the following Census Metropolitan Areas: Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver. 
Trust 
The EDS question is framed as: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” The answers were binary. 
 
Self employed 
A dichotomous variable indicating the respondent being self-employed defined as the 
person who is 'self employed' earns an income directly from their own business, trade 
or profession, rather than being paid a specified salary or wage by an employer, EDS 
Guide, page. 288. 
 
ln (wage) Natural logarithm of the respondents’ hourly wage.  
ln(y) See ln(wage) 
Education 
 
Years of schooling. 
 
Mother’s educ. Mother’s education: Measured by years of schooling. 
Father’s educ. Father’s education: Measured by years of schooling. 
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Table 1. Continued. 
Experience 
Potential experience (in absence of any better measure) computed by age-years of 
education-6. The resulting number is truncated so that the potential experience is 
smaller or equal 40. 
 
Experience Sq. Squared term of Experience  
Immigrant Not a Canadian born where Canadian born is defined as an individual either born in Canada or born outside Canada from Canadian parents.  
Visible minority 
 
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for visible minority as it is defined in the 
Employment Equity Act "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-
Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". 
 
Non-native speaker A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for persons whose mother tongue (s)   neither is (includes) French nor English. 
Social networking 
proxy 
A variable taking values of 0 to 4 standing for the number of social groups the 
respondent takes part. 
No religious 
affiliation 
 
No Religious Affiliation: It includes No religion, Agnostic, Atheist, Humanist, 
Personal Faith, Free Thinker, Spiritual and Other.  EDS Guide, p. 87. 
Catholic 
 
It includes the following denomination: Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic, Polish 
National Catholic Church, Other Catholic. 
 
Protestant 
Anglican, Baptist, Jehovah's Witnesses, Lutheran, Mennonite, Pentecostal, 
Presbyterian, United Church, Other Protestant. 
 
Other 
Other religions including Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikh, Other Eastern religions, Other 
Christian denominations such as Orthodox. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Religiosity index 7.7 5.2 0  15 
Scaled religiosity index 5.7 5.1 0  15 
Importance of religion 2.7 1.8 0 5 
Religious practice in group 2.3 1.8 0 5 
Scaled religious practice in groups 1.1 1.8 0 5 
Individual religious practice  2.7 2.1 0 5 
Scaled Individual religious practice  2.0 2.3 0 5 
Hourly wage  21.0 10.8   7.7      153.8 
Natural logarithm of hourly wage 2.9 0.4    2.04 5.0 
Education  13.2 3.7 7 20 
Mother’s education 9.8 3.4 7 16 
Father’s education 9.8 3.6 7 16 
Age  41.0  11.6 16 65 
Experience 21.4  11.7 0 40 
Experience squared   589.2    709.8 0     1600 
Social networking proxy 0.57 0.8 0 4 
University degree 0.24 --- --- --- 
Female 0.45 --- --- --- 
Married 0.54 --- --- --- 
Immigrant 0.22 --- --- --- 
Visible Minority 0.19 --- --- --- 
Non-official language 0.25 --- --- --- 
Trust 0.48 --- --- --- 
Self-employed 0.16 --- --- --- 
No religious affiliation 0.17 --- --- --- 
Catholic 0.41 --- --- --- 
Protestant 0.25 --- --- --- 
Jewish 0.01 --- --- --- 
Muslim 0.02 --- --- --- 
Other 0.13 --- --- --- 
Montréal 0.12 --- --- --- 
Toronto 0.17 --- --- --- 
Vancouver 0.07 --- --- --- 
Other Metropolitan areas 0.31 --- --- --- 
Non-metropolitan 0.33 --- --- --- 
Note 
Sample is restricted to working respondents (N=18812). Sample weights are applied. 
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Table 3. Socio-demographics Indicators by Denominations  
Religions Percentage Mean Age (Std. Dev.) 
Children # 
(Std. Dev.) 
Household Size 
(Std. Dev.) 
Immigrant 
Population (%) 
No religious affiliation 17  38.7 (11.3) 
0.7 
(1.0) 
2.8 
(1.3) 23 
Catholic 42 41.1 (11.1) 
0.9 
(1.1) 
3.0 
(1.3) 18 
Protestant 25 43.3 (11.5) 
1.0 
(1.1) 
3.0 
(1.3) 14 
Jewish 1 45.6 (12.9) 
0.5 
(0.9) 
2.9 
(1.4) 39 
Muslim 2 38.9 (11.2) 
1.4 
(1.3) 
3.8 
(1.4) 94 
Other 13 39.2 (12.4) 
0.9 
(1.1) 
3.2 
(1.4) 39 
Sample 100 41.0 (11.6) 
0.9 
(1.1) 
3.0 
(1.3) 22 
Note 
Sample is restricted to working respondents (N=18812). Sample weights are applied. 
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Table 4.  Mean Religiosity Indicators by Denomination  
 Importance of religion 
Individual  
religious pra. 
Collective  
religious pra. 
Unscaled 
religiosity ind. 
Scaled 
religiosity ind. 
Catholic 3.3   (1.3) 
3.4  
 (1.7) 
2.8 
(1.5) 
9.5 
(3.8) 
6.9 
(4.5) 
Protestant 3.2 (1.4) 
3.3 
(1.7) 
2.8 
(1.5) 
9.3 
(4.0) 
6.8 
(4.8) 
Jewish 3.8 (1.3) 
3.1 
(1.6) 
3.0 
(1.3) 
10.0 
(3.5) 
6.8 
(4.0) 
Muslim 4.0 (1.4) 
3.9 
(1.6) 
2.9 
(1.7) 
10.8 
(3.8) 
8.9 
(4.8) 
Others 3.6 (1.6) 
3.6 
(1.8) 
3.0 
(1.7) 
10.2 
(4.6) 
8.2 
(5.1) 
Sample* 3.3  (1.5) 
2.9 
(1.6) 
3.4 
(1.8) 
9.6 
(4.3) 
7.3 
(4.9) 
Note 
Standard deviations are reported in between parentheses below means.  *The sample is restricted to working religious believer 
respondents (N=15,094) excluding respondents of no religious affiliation.  
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Table 5.  Denominations, Earnings and Educational Attainment 
 Mean Hourly Wage in Canadian Dollars (Standard Deviation) Human Capital 
 General Male Female Education  University Degree 
No relig. 21.5 (11.2) 
22.3 
(9.2) 
19.9 
(10.1) 13.6 26.2% 
Catholic 20.3 (10.7) 
21.4 
(10.9) 
18.9 
(10.3) 13.2 22.3% 
Protestant 21.6 (11.1) 
22.6 
(10.2) 
20.4 
(12.0) 13.2 21.3% 
Jewish 25.9 (13.4) 
29.0 
(15.0) 
22.2 
(10.0) 15.4 51.4% 
Muslim 19.1 (12.1) 
20.2 
(13.6) 
16.8 
(8.0) 14.5 42.9% 
Other 
19.9 
(9.8) 
21.2 
(9.2) 
18.0 
(10.5) 12.4 24.3% 
Sample 20.8 
(10.9) 
21.9 
(10.9) 
19.4 
(10.8) 13.2 23.6% 
Note 
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis below the means. Sample is restricted to working respondents (N=18812). 
Sample weights are applied. Education is in years. The column noted by Degree indicates the percentage of the respondents 
within the groups that has obtained a university degree.  
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Table 6. Earnings Function Augmented by Unscaled Religiosity Index 
Dependent Variable:  Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage 
Indep. Variables (1)           (2)         (3)        (4)         (5) 
Unscaled relig. index×10 
 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.046** 
 (0.009) 
 
-0.071** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.053** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.056** 
(0.009) 
Education ----  
0.036** 
(0.001) 
0.047** 
(0.001) 
0.048** 
(0.001) 
0.041** 
(0.002) 
Mother Educ. ----  
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
0.004** 
 (0.002) 
Father Educ. ----  
---- 
 
---- 
 
---- 
 
0.004**   
(0.001) 
Experience ----  
---- 
 
0.024** 
(0.001) 
0.024** 
(0.001) 
0.022** 
 (0.002) 
Experience Sq×10000. ----  
---- 
 
-3.143** 
(0.375) 
 
-3.185** 
 (0.347) 
 
-2.946**  
 (0.372) 
Female ----  
---- 
 
---- 
 
-0.123** 
(0.009) 
-0.070** 
(0.014) 
Constant 2.977** (0.009) 
2.485** 
 (0.022) 
2.034** 
  (0.025) 
2.081** 
  (0.031) 
2.030**   
(0.031) 
R2 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.22 
Note 
Five regressions are reported in this Table. Number of observations is 18812 and sample weights are applied. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients. The sign * means 10% level 
of significance while ** stands for 0.05% or lower levels of significance. The estimated coefficients of Religiosity index and 
Experience squared are multiplied by 10 and 10000 respectively. 
 
The set of explanatory variables are of the regression (5): education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, 
marital status, dummies for female, married female, immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-
employment, social networking proxy and locations. 
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Table 7. Earnings Function Augmented by Religiosity Indicators 
Dependent Variable:  Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage 
 Unscaled Scaled 
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3)       (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Religiosity index×10. 
 
-0.056** 
(0.009) 
 
---- 
 
 
-0.064** 
(0.009) 
     ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Importance of rel.×10. ---- -0.211** (0.051) ---- 
-0.127** 
(0.003) 
-0.177** 
(0.025) ---- ---- 
Collective practice ×10. ---- 0.127** (0.046) ---- 
0.000 
(0.003) ---- 
-0.105** 
(0.027) ---- 
Individual practice×10. ---- -0.074** (0.035) ---- 
-0.062** 
(0.025) ---- ---- 
-0.120** 
(0.020) 
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Note 
Seven regressions are reported in the table. Number of observations is 18812 and sample weights are applied. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses below coefficients. The sign * means 10% level of 
significance while ** stands for 0.05% or lower levels of significance. The estimated coefficient of religiosity indicators are 
multiplied by 10. 
 
The set of explanatory variables are: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, 
dummies for female, married female, immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment 
and locations. 
 
In the regressions noted by “Scaled” the frequency of religious practice both individually and in group is scaled so that the 
passage from one discrete category to the other maps to a proportionate yearly measure of religious practice. 
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Table 8. (Degree of) Religiosity and  Denominations 
Dependent Variable:  Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage 
Denominations Catholic Protestant Jewish Muslim Other 
Denomination dummies  -0.041** (0.012) 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.034) 
-0.146** 
(0.036) 
-0.065** 
(0.015) 
Denomination dummies × 
Religiosity index ×10.  
-0.087** 
(0.020) 
-0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.235** 
(0.089) 
-0.004 
(0.089) 
-0.084** 
(0.025) 
Denomination dummies  0.042 (0.022) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
0.240** 
(0.098) 
-0.117 
(0.110) 
0.017 
(0.030) 
 
Note 
Two regressions are included in this table.  The first row of the results separated by triple lines is an estimation in which only 
dummies for denominations are added to the regression (the omitted category is no religious affiliation).  In other words in this 
regression the impact of degree of religiosity is not taken into account. This regression’s R2 is 0.22.  
 
In the second regression (the two last rows of the results) the degree of religiosity by denomination is also accounted for (the 
omitted category is no religious affiliation): This regression included not only dummies for each denomination but also their 
interaction terms with unscaled religiosity index. This regression’s R2 is 0.22. 
 
In both regressions sample weights are applied. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses below 
coefficients. The sign * means 10% level of significance while ** stands for 0.05% or lower levels of significance. 
 
The set of explanatory variables are: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, dummies for 
female, married female, immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social networking 
proxy and locations.  
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Table 9. F-statistics for the equality of coefficients 
F-statistics (P-value) 
 Protestant Jew Muslim Other 
Catholic 2.76 (0.10) 
2.37 
(0.12) 
9.07 
(0.00) 
2.73 
(0.10) 
Protestant ---- 0.86 (0.35) 
12.33  
(0.00) 
7.84 
(0.01) 
Jew ---- ---- 11.08  (0.00) 
4.63 
(0.03) 
Muslim ---- ---- ---- 5.43 (0.02) 
Dummies for denominations 
Catholic 1.53 (0.22) 
3.81 
(0.05) 
2.16 
(0.14) 
0.37 
(0.54) 
Protestant ---- 5.33 (0.02) 
1.33 
(0.25) 
0.17 
(0.68) 
Jew ---- ---- 5.98 (0.01) 
4.50 
(0.03) 
Muslim ---- ----- ---- 1.60 (0.21) 
Religiosity Index 
Catholic 3.78 (0.05) 
2.41 
(0.12) 
0.34 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
Protestant ---- 4.67 (0.03) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
0.17 
(0.68) 
Jew ---- ---- 2.40 (0.12) 
2.98 
(0.08) 
Muslim ---- ----- ---- 0.35 (0.56) 
Note 
The first set of results, separated by triple lines, is based on the regression reported in the first row of Table 8 (including only 
dummies for denominations). The second set of results is based on the second regression reported in Table 8 (including interaction 
of unscaled religiosity index and denominations’ dummies as well as dummies). 
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Table 10. Human Capital Returns by Denominations 
Dependent Variable:  Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage 
 (1) (2) 
Denomination No relig. Catholic Protestant Jewish Muslim Other All groups 
Education 0.042** (0.002) 
0.041** 
(0.003) 
0.042** 
(0.003) 
0.043** 
(0.011) 
0.041** 
(0.010) 
0.037** 
(0.004) 
0.042** 
(0.002) 
Experience 0.025** (0.003) 
0.023** 
(0.002) 
0.020** 
(0.003) 
0.036** 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.024** 
(0.004) 
0.023** 
(0.002) 
Experience sq. 
×10000. 
-3.307** 
(0.858) 
-3.322** 
(0.593) 
-2.240** 
(0.707) 
-5.328* 
(2.800) 
0.185 
(3.025) 
-3.965** 
(0.999) 
-3.057** 
(0.372) 
Dummies --- 0.012 (0.047) 
0.020 
(0.055) 
-0.114 
(0.185) 
0.016 
(0.176) 
0.056 
(0.062) ---- 
Constant 1.982** (0.050) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
1.988** 
(0.031) 
R2 0.22      0.22 
Note  
Table contains two regressions. The second regression noted by All groups is included for sake of comparison. Samples are 
restricted to working respondents (N=18812). Sample weights are applied. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
the parentheses below coefficients. The sign * means 10% level of significance while ** stands for 0.05% or lower levels of 
significance. The estimated coefficient of Experience squared is multiplied by 10000. 
 
The set of explanatory variables are: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, dummies for 
female, married female, immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social networking proxy 
and locations.  
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Table 11. Marginal Return to Experience by Denominations 
 (1) (2) 
 No relig. Catholic Protestant Jewish Muslim Other All groups 
5 years 0.022** (0.002) 
0.020** 
(0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
0.030** 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.020** 
(0.003) 
0.020** 
(0.001) 
10 years 0.019** (0.002) 
0.016** 
(0.001) 
0.015** 
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.06) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.002) 
0.017** 
(0.001) 
20 years 0.012** (0.001) 
0.010** 
(0.001) 
0.011** 
(0.001) 
0.014** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.001) 
 
0.011** 
(0.000) 
Note 
The marginal returns are computed by estimates reported in Table 10  through the following: 
Marginal return to years of experience = 𝛽𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 + 2𝛽𝛽2  × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅. The second regression 
noted by All groups is included for sake of comparison. 
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Table 12. Human Capital Returns by Denominations & Immigrants 
Dependent Variable:  Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage 
Denomination No relig. Catholic Protestant Jewish Muslim Other Immigrant 
Education 0.044** (0.003) 
0.043** 
(0.003) 
0.044** 
(0.003) 
0.049** 
(0.011) 
0.048** 
(0.010) 
0.041** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
Experience 0.028** (0.003) 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
0.022** 
(0.003) 
0.042** 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.029** 
(0.004) 
-0.015** 
(0.004) 
Experience sq.×10000. -3.919** (0.881) 
-3.753** 
(0.625) 
-2.583** 
(0.733) 
-6.489** 
(2.725) 
-2.580 
(3.116) 
-4.953** 
(1.089) 
2.976** 
(0.843) 
Denomination dummies 
 --- 
0.012 
(0.047) 
0.036 
(0.055) 
-0.180 
(0.185) 
-0.153 
(0.176) 
0.010 
(0.062) 
0.199** 
(0.060) 
Constant 1.937** (0.051) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
R2 0.22       
Note  
Samples are restricted to working respondents (N=18812). Sample weights are applied. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses below coefficients. The sign * means 10% level of significance while ** stands for 0.05% or lower 
levels of significance. The estimated coefficient of Experience squared is multiplied by 10000. 
The set of explanatory variables are: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, dummies for 
female, immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social networking proxy and locations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Table 13. Marginal Return to Experience by Denominations 
 No relig. Catholic Protestant Jewish Muslim Other Immigrants 
5 years 0.024** (0.002) 
0.021** 
(0.002) 
0.019** 
(0.002) 
0.035** 
(0.009) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.024** 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.003) 
10 years 0.020** (0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.001) 
0.016** 
(0.002) 
0.029** 
(0.06) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.019** 
(0.002) 
-0.009** 
(0.002) 
20 years 0.012** (0.001) 
0.010** 
(0.001) 
0.011** 
(0.001) 
0.016** 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Note 
The marginal returns are computed by estimates reported in Table 12 through the following: 
Marginal return to years of experience = 𝛽𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 + 2𝛽𝛽2  × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅.  
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Table 14. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition with Reduced Equation 
Group Difference  Explained % Explained. Unexplained % Unexplained 
Catholic 
0.051** 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-18 
0.060** 
(0.012) 
118 
Protestant 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.034** 
(0.009) 
425 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
-325 
Jew 
-0.186** 
(0.040) 
-0.128** 
(0.022) 
69 
-0.058 
(0.037) 
31 
Muslim 
0.136** 
(0.038) 
0.021 
(0.027) 
15 
0.115** 
(0.041) 
85 
Other 
0.072** 
(0.017) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
29 
0.051** 
(0.016) 
71 
Note 
No religious affiliation is assumed to be the non-discriminatory category. The underlying regressions have only included 
education, experience, experience squared and dummies for female, native speaker, visible minority, immigrant and self-
employment as explanatory variables and a constant.   
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Table 15. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition with Reduced Equation: Details 
 Explained Unexplained 
Group Difference Educ. Exper. Others Educ. Exper. Others 
Catholic 0.051** (0.013) 
0.017** 
(0.006) -0.030 0.005 
0.038 
(0.051) 0.059 -0.038 
Protestant -0.008 (0.015) 
0.016** 
(0.006) -0.051 0.001 
0.025 
(0.054) 0.066 -0.066 
Jew -0.186** (0.040) 
-0.104** 
(0.015) -0.047 0.022 
0.012 
(0.168) -0.082 0.012 
Muslim 0.136** (0.038) 
-0.081** 
(0.014) 0.013 0.090 
0.115 
(0.157) 0.137 -0.138 
Other 0.072** (0.017) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 0.001 0.036 
0.090 
(0.065) 0.052 -0.090 
Note 
No religious affiliation is assumed to be the non-discriminatory category. The underlying regressions have only included 
education, experience, experience squared and dummies for female, native speaker, visible minority, immigrant and self-
employment as explanatory variables and a constant.   
The contribution of Experience is computed as the sum of the contribution of the level and the squared terms included in the 
regression. Both terms of the contribution of experience were statistically significant at 5% level for the Explained portion except 
for Muslims and Other. 
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Table 16. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition with Augmented Equation 
Group Difference  Explained % Explained. Unexplained % Unexplained 
Catholic 
0.051** 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-4 
0.053** 
(0.014) 
104 
Protestant 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.050** 
(0.010) 
625 
0.042** 
(0.015) 
-525 
Jew 
-0.186** 
(0.040) 
-0.183** 
(0.026) 
98 
-0.003 
(0.038) 
2 
Muslim 
0.136** 
(0.038) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
6 
0.128** 
(0.042) 
94 
Other 
0.072** 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
12 
0.063** 
(0.017) 
88 
Note 
No religious affiliation is assumed to be the non-discriminatory category. The underlying regressions have the whole set of 
explanatory variables: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, dummies for female, 
immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social networking proxy and locations.   
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Table 17. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition with Augmented Equation: Details 
 Explained Unexplained 
Group Difference Educ. Exper. Others Educ. Exper. Others 
Catholic 0.051** (0.013) 
0.015** 
(0.005) -0.026 0.010 
0.050 
(0.055) 0.022 -0.019 
Protestant -0.008 (0.015) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) -0.046 0.010 
0.069 
(0.058) 0.046 -0.074 
Jew -0.186** (0.041) 
-0.091** 
(0.013) -0.041 -0.050 
-0.076 
(0.165) -0.061  0.134 
Muslim 0.136** (0.038) 
-0.071** 
(0.013) 0.011 0.068 
0.128 
(0.144) 0.021 -0.021 
Other 0.072** (0.017) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 0.001 0.023 
0.097 
(0.070) 0.025 -0.059 
Note 
No religious affiliation is assumed to be the non-discriminatory category. The underlying regressions include the full set of 
explanatory variables: education, experience, experience squared, parents’ education, marital status, dummies for female, 
immigrant, visible minority, native speaker, trusting behaviour, self-employment, social networking proxy and locations.   
The contribution of Experience is computed as the sum of the contribution of the level and the squared terms included in the 
regression. Both terms of the contribution of experience were statistically significant at 5% level for the Explained portion except 
for Muslims and Other. 
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Figure 1. Return to Years of Experience by Denomination: All Sample 
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Figure 2. Return to Years of Experience by Denomination: Natives  
 
 
 
Legend 
No religious affil.  
Catholic  
Protestant  
Jew  
Muslim  
Other  
Note 
The graph is based on the 
estimation reported in Table 12. 
 
 
  
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Experience (yrs)
ln(y)
98 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Behavioural Replicator Equation: Accounting for Social 
Influence 
 
 
Maryam E. Dilmaghani 
McGill University, Department of Economics and CIRANO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
I. Introduction 
            This paper’s objective is to put forward an equation suitable for modelling the 
changes in population proportion of types. Types are defined based on the heterogeneity 
of the agents’ preferences or behavioural rules as it is the manner in economics. One of 
the increasingly popular ways of analytically treating this class of questions is to use the 
evolutionary population dynamics, termed the replicator equation. The qualitative and 
quantitative conclusions that stem from the replicator equation are sensitive to the 
specification of its fitness function. The contribution of this paper to existing literature is 
to propose a parametric formulation for fitness function that adequately matches 
mechanisms behind replication in social contexts and proposing an amended version for 
the equation. The proposed version is constructed by incorporating the components of 
social influence into its original formulation. 
            The replicator equation is one of the standard frameworks for evolutionary 
analysis.  Besides its systematic use in mathematical biology with the ongoing interest in 
biology-inspired evolutionary approaches in social sciences, it is nowadays used by 
scholars of many fields with serious evolutionary inclinations or occasional evolutionary 
perspectives. Economic research is not an exception (for underlying debates see for 
instance: Andersen 1994 and 2004; Buenstorf 2006; Cordes 2006 and 2007; Foster 1997; 
Knudsen 2002 and 2004; Laurent and Nightingale 2001; Nelson 1995 and 2006; Witt 
1999 and 2008b). The replicator equation is exceedingly used in economics in various 
contexts from the evolution of preferences to information propagation, learning, and in 
combination with game theory (see e.g. Bala and Long 2005; Cressman et al. 2006; 
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Friedman 1998; Hansson and Stewart, 1990; Noailly et al. 2003; Salomonsson and 
Weibull 2006; Samuelson 2002; Saviotti 1995). 
            Moreover, although not yet explicitly put forward, this equation can be used for 
modelling the interdependencies in economic agents’ preferences and their related 
feedback mechanisms. In the context of consumer behaviour these interdependencies are 
suggested to be produced by either status-seeking or conformity and compliance with 
social norms in consumption that can be designated by the term social influence. Also 
notice that the replicator equation provides analytical means for the investigation of how 
a minority type of preferences may evolve into a majority type of preferences. Hence, it 
can be used to study the evolution of social norms, for instance how a consumption act 
changes from a means to signal the consumer’s status to a means of conformity and norm 
compliance. Also, note that the above-mentioned interdependency can be extended from 
agents’ preferences to less saliently preference-based behavioural and decision rules (see: 
Cole et al., 1992; Fershtman and Weiss 1993; Oxoby 2004; Woersdorfer 2010).  
            In biological sciences, the replicator equation is used to capture the process of 
natural selection. Natural selection is the prevalence of a genetically inheritable trait in a 
population which is heterogeneous with respect to the possession of this trait after a 
period of time and succession of generations. The selection is due to the advantages the 
trait provides to the carrying individuals in reproduction or reproduction-related 
characteristics. The concept of natural selection is included in the replicator equation 
through its fitness function. However, the mathematical formulation of the equation 
contains such a degree of abstraction as to allow for the use of the equation in a variety of 
contexts only minimally analogous to the original one, since it entirely abstracts from 
heterosexual reproduction characteristic of animal species in its original application. 
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            Beginning with Dawkins' proposition (1976, 1983) on the context-independence 
of Darwinian principles of evolution and its refinements to date, the scholarly use of this 
equation in social science fields has built upon viewing inheritance as a synonym for 
social transmission and selection resulting from a relative advantage in one type’s 
conception compared to another type’s in the context. In other words, social evolution is 
considered analogous to biological evolution (for the discussion of this analogy see: Witt 
2004 and 2008b; Vromen 2004 and 2006; Nelson and Winter 2002). Note that social 
transmission is used in this paper as a broader term for learning, imitation and 
information propagation1
            However, given that social transmission designates propagation mechanisms that, 
in principle, do not result from rational choice or rational decision making the previous 
uses of the replicator equation create a mismatch between fitness functions and the 
replication processes. This mismatch not only impairs the conceptual legitimacy of the 
use of the equation but also can lead to implausible conclusions. So far in the literature, 
no adequate attention has been paid to the conceptual legitimacy of combining the 
assumption of replication of traits in social issues (social transmission), which is by 
construction a mechanism parallel to the rational decision making, and rational choice 
. Given the high degree of abstraction in the equation’s 
formulation, abstracting from heterosexual reproduction, this interpretation causes no 
major inconvenience. As of the fitness function, a review of economic literature making 
use of the replicator equation shows that rational choice related variables such as relative 
prices or game theoretical payoffs are used.   
                                                          
1 There are also the examples of the use of replicator equation in which the original interpretation of 
replication, inheritance, has been implicitly or explicitly used. This conception is however debatable and 
cannot be generalised to cover all possible forms of social evolution: it is often observed that preferences 
and behavioural rules evolve in very short periods of time without any succession of generations. In this 
paper, I focus on the latter cases i.e. I assume that social transmission occurs independent from the 
succession of generations. 
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related fitness functions (e.g. relative price) routinely used. In fact, usually the need for a 
richer dynamics pattern (e.g. period-cycles and chaos) that cannot be achieved otherwise 
motivates researchers to use the replicator equation. 
           In this paper first, I discuss the above-mentioned mismatch from the vantage point 
of the legitimacy of using the replicator equation to model the evolution of preferences, 
beliefs and social norms in human societies. I argue that the use of the original version of 
the replicator equation not only lacks a strong conceptual legitimacy as a result of the 
imperfection of the analogy between human societies and biological systems but also it 
may produce misleading conclusions. Second, I propose remedying this shortcoming by 
integrating into the original version of the equation psychological the factors that regulate 
societal evolution through social influence. More precisely, I propose a fitness function 
that is adjusted to the specificities of social transmission mechanisms by incorporating 
the components of social influence into the equation. The components of social influence 
are consistently suggested, in the literature of all related fields, to be conformity and 
status-seeking. In my proposition, they are specified in terms of population proportions 
leaving the analytical tractability of the equation intact.             
            The remainder of the paper is organized in three consecutive sections. Section II 
builds into my proposed version of the replicator equation after reviewing its behavioural 
and psychological justifications. In the following section I derive the main patterns 
resulting from the proposed version of the equation. The last section contains some 
concluding remarks and suggests some applications. 
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II. Introducing Behavioural Replicator Equation 
            This section begins with an introduction to the original formulation of the 
equation and builds, through a few steps, into the behavioural version. 
II. 1. Original Formulation 
            Suppose a population normalized at 1 and composed of two types: A and B. The 
proportion of type A at period 𝑡𝑡 is denoted by 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  while the proportion of type B in the 
same period is denoted by 1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 . The one-dimensional discrete time formulation of the 
replicator equation is then 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )  where 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) is the fitness function. 
Fitness function summarizes the factors affecting the rate of replication of the type 
designated by  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  compared to the other type, designated by (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡). If 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 1 then 
we have 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥� ; in other words the system is at a fixed point. 
Insert Figure 1 in here. 
            The shape of the equation and as a result its predictions, are very sensitive to the 
specification of the fitness function 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡). The equation for a constant fitness greater 
than 1 is depicted above for the sake of illustration2
     Fitness can occasionally be assumed to be a constant; more frequently it needs to vary 
with population proportion of types. Typically when the number of parameters involved 
. There are two fixed points, 0 and 1, 
meaning the population at the steady states will be homogenous (either of type A or of 
type B). This illustration shows that for any initial proportion of type A smaller than 1 the 
population proportion of this type converges to 0 i.e., type A will become extinct over 
time.  
                                                          
2 The plotted equation is = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +3(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) . 
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in the specification of fitness function is greater than 4 no analytical solution can be 
found for the fixed points. Below, there is the illustration of a dynamically richer system3
            As it was explained in the introduction, the use of the replicator equation for 
modelling socioeconomic evolutions (of preferences, behavioural rules and beliefs) 
mainly relies on the re-interpretation of biological inheritance to social transmission. 
Social transmission is either imitation (see e.g. Alós-Ferrer 2003; Boyd and Richardson 
1985; Cubitt and Sugden 1998; Hofbauer and Schlag 2001; Schlag 1998; Schnedler 
2004) or learning (see e.g. Beggs 2005; Börgers and Sarin 1997; Hopkins and Posch 
2005; Sasaki 2005; Witt 2008a). This conception of economic agents’ behaviour is at 
variance with the rational choice framework from a number of stand points. Thus, the 
replicator equation is more suited to be used when the researcher decides that the rational 
choice framework provides an inadequate description of the question under consideration.  
.  
Insert Figure 2 in here. 
            Higher degrees of fitness function with respect to the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  can generate the 
whole set of complex dynamic behaviour, i.e., period cycles and chaos. This property 
proves the potential of the replicator equation for the analytical investigation of time-
trajectories and fixed points of various socioeconomic issues reducible to the evolving 
proportion of types. However, it is also the pitfall of the equation as it calls for high 
precaution in applications: this sensitivity of the predictions to both the specification of 
fitness functions as well as parameter values makes the use of the equation for applied 
matters challenging.  
II. 2. Criticism of Previous Applications 
                                                          
3 The plotted equation is 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )(2𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +0.4)−1   ; 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) = (𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽)−1 with  equation α=2 and β=0.4. 
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            First, in the case of modelling the evolution of preferences the use of the 
replicator equation implies that the preferences of individual agents are changing. 
However preferences are assumed to be stable in neoclassical economic theory4
     Second, the use of replicator equation implies that agents replicate others’ behavioural 
rules or preferences instead of deciding rationally. This is also at variance with the 
conceptions regularly used in neoclassical economic theory. Third, utility function in 
neoclassical economic theory summarises human motivations by capturing the 
ophelimity, i.e., the power to give satisfaction. However, it has been debated that not all 
of the human incentives of economic impact can be represented through regular utility 
functions for various reasons (see e.g. Bayer et al. 2005). The replication (social 
transmission) of preferences is one of such cases, since in these contexts preferences 
become interdependent or frequency dependent (see e.g. Abel 1990; Bruegger 2005; Witt 
1989; Hatfield et al. 1993). This interdependence, problematic for the axiomatic version 
of neoclassical utilitarianism, is compatible with the replicator equation that replaces 
representative agent reasoning with population reasoning. For these reasons, I believe, it 
.  Recent 
literature however, contains alternative conceptions such as endogenous preferences, 
discovered preferences and constructed preferences (see for instance: Bowles 1998, 
Bowles and Gintis 2001, Braga and Starmer 2005). This strand of literature is compatible 
with my conception in this paper. Mainly, this paper assumes the accuracy of these 
alternative views about the structure of human preferences. However, this paper 
addresses the population-wide consequences of social influence given the possibility that 
preferences evolve.  
                                                          
4 For instance we read in Harrod (1938): “The method of procedure is to take certain elements of the 
structure as given – namely the preference lists of individuals for goods and services”; and in Becker 
(1976) we find: “[P]references are assumed not to change substantially over time”. 
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is at least conceptually questionable to combine the replicator equation with rational 
choice related variables such as relative price. More argument follows. 
           In evolutionary biology fitness function is the way to capture the forces behind 
natural selection. Natural selection comes from the observation that the existence of 
natural constraints ultimately favours one type (identified through a distinctive inheritable 
trait) compared to another in reproduction-related matters, leading to that type’s 
increasing proportion overtime after the succession of generations. In social matters, 
likewise, there are forces that intervene and determine the pattern of growth (replication) 
of one type of preferences, behavioural rules or beliefs compared to the other(s). These 
forces that stand behind the relative advantage of a type must inherently relate to the 
concept of social transmission so that the use of the replicator equation in social contexts 
remains consistent with its design. Therefore, like in evolutionary biology, the fitness 
function needs to capture the relative impact of the distinctive trait under consideration on 
the success in replication. This is not exactly the case with rational choice related signals 
such as relative price or interest rate that are used in economics to stand for fitness 
function. These variables surely affect the agents’ behaviour but not through replication: 
their channel of impact is rational decision making. The mere assumption of replication 
as means of evolution in socioeconomic contexts implies, by construction, the existence 
of forces parallel to rational choice signals that affect individual agents. Thus, I believe, 
using rational signals as mechanisms behind trait selection along social transmission 
make an incoherent couple. 
           Moreover, if other social factors that affect replication in human societies (social 
transmission) are overlooked the predictions of the replicator equation become unrealistic 
in a wide range of contexts. For instance it becomes impossible to model frequently 
107 
 
observed outcomes in human societies in which behavioural patterns or preferences that 
have dominated payoffs do not disappear (e.g. altruistic and other-regarding behaviours). 
In fact, we even observe that they may reach the status of majority or even become the 
consensus in a society. Or it becomes impossible to conceive any change in the 
proportion of types of behaviours and preferences that do not procure any gain or loss 
(fitness neutral traits in evolutionary terms). All else equal, if the prices of two goods are 
the same the population proportion of types of preferences should a priori remain 
constant; however we observe that it is not necessarily the case in human societies. 
           I end this discussion with an example. For instance a lower relative price increases 
the number of consumers of a given good in its own right, in a way (that should be seen 
as) independent from social transmission (as I will explain below, mediated by social 
influence). But if we intend to model the dynamic pattern of consumption not only as a 
result of a lower relative price but also as a result of the impression that the consumption 
of this good creates in peers or as a results of the high level of advertisement, then the 
recourse to the replicator equation is legitimate: the assumption of social transmission (of 
preferences in this instance) is plausible. However, a relevant fitness function cannot be 
(uniquely) comprised of the relative price of the good (resulting for general equilibrium 
hence usual utility maximization) but also the forces that made for the possibility of 
social transmission. It means in this example, accounting for what made the impression 
created by the consumption of this good or the advertisement for it of an impact on the 
pattern of consumption. These factors to account for, I believe, are the components of 
social influence. 
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II. 3. The Components of Social Influence 
            The proposed version of the equation results from the introduction of the 
components of social influence into the fitness function. Following Akerlof (1997) and 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) I set status-seeking (the attraction of minority in abstract 
terms) and conformity (the attraction of majority in abstract terms) as the forces behind 
the dynamics of social influence in human societies.  
           Social influence, conceived in a way compatible way the above, is also receiving a 
great deal of attention particularly in empirical and theoretical literature axed on 
consumer identity and its impact on consumption behaviour (for an exhaustive 
examination of this question see: Saad 2007; see also: Do and Long 2008; Woersdorfer 
2010). 
            Conformity is defined as a process by which people's beliefs or behaviours are 
influenced by others within a group. People can be influenced through subtle, even 
unconscious processes, or by direct peer pressure. Conformity is a group behaviour and 
influences the formation and maintenance of social norms and beliefs (see: Aronson et al. 
2005; Baron et al. 1996; Bisin and Verdier 2000; Bernheim, 1994; Boyd and Richardson 
1985; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Jones 1984; Latane 1981).  
            The other part of our social influence conception as a motivation of behaviour in 
general, status-seeking, has been suggested by many scholars as well. Status–seeking has 
been advanced either independently from or alongside conformity (see e.g. Baron et al. 
1996; Becker 1991; Becker and Murphy 2000; Brekke et al. 2003; Dosi et al. 1994). The 
concept of status-seeking is set next to compliance with social norms (conformity) as 
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motivation behind certain kinds of consumption decisions as well (Leibenstein 1950; 
Bernheim 1994; Frank 1989 and 1999).  
            The economic literature on the link between social influence and consumer 
behavior (inclusive of the question of interdependence or complementarity of 
preferences) is also rich. And here too, social influence itself, is decomposed to status-
seeking and conformity. For instance we read in Woersdorfer (2010): “Interdependencies 
in consumer behavior stem from either status-seeking consumption or compliance with 
social norms.”  
     Starting with Velben’s seminal work (1899), there is a wide range of articles on the 
impact of status-seeking motivations on consumption patterns using different 
methodology. The earliest study of the impact of status-seeking on economic outcomes, 
using a formal framework, is that of Duesenberry (1949). Abel (1990) and Hopkins and 
Kornienko (2004) are more recent formal conceptions; while the former considers status-
seeking in a dynamic framework, the latter makes use of a game theoretical approach to 
tangle this question. Empirically, the pioneering work of Richard Easterlin (1974) is of 
note. The consequence of status-seeking, measured by the impact of income inequality on 
subjective well-being, is also considered by Clark (2003) and Alesina et al. (2003) among 
others. 
             In addition, I postulate that the two factors of conformity and status-seeking are 
affected in their magnitude by a third factor, organized social support. In my conception, 
organized social support includes institutions and organizations, publicity, advertisement, 
lobbying and the like. In the next subsection, I propose an analytically tractable way to 
mathematically capture all the components of social influence (conformity, status-seeking 
and organised social support). 
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II. 4. Proposed Version 
            I propose the following mathematical form for the relative payoff resulting from 
social influence: 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1/2)2 where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  is the proportion of the agents carrying the 
preference trait, belief or behaviour under consideration at period 𝑡𝑡 and the parameter 
𝑔𝑔 stands for the aforementioned organized social support.  
            The expression (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1/2)2 is set to capture the two symmetric tendencies toward 
conformity and status-seeking: as the proportion of the agents carrying a given preference 
type, decision rule or behavioural rule gets close to 1 the payoff of (incentive for) 
adopting it increases, reaching a maximum at 1 which means the payoff (hence the 
motivation) for the remaining individuals to follow the rest of society increases until it 
achieves the status of common consensus (standing in this paper for fixed point equal 1 as 
an alternative designation). On the other hand when the trait is shared by a small portion 
of the society the payoff is high as a result of status-seeking.  
            The parameter 𝑔𝑔 is a multiplier to capture what I called organized social support 
for the trait under consideration in the previous subsection. For instance if a given 
preference type, belief or behavioural rule receives considerable media attention or 
regular support from an established social organization or lobbyists, then the impact of 
the two primary components of social influence conformity and status seeking increase in 
magnitude by this multiplier. The social influence payoff function is graphed below for 
two different magnitudes of the parameter 𝑔𝑔. Notice that it is sensible to assume that the 
parameter 𝑔𝑔 is a real number greater than unity and this range is assumed throughout this 
paper5
                                                          
5 Plotted equations: 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1/2)2 for g=10 (dashed line) and g=50 (solid line). 
. 
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Insert Figure 3 in here. 
            It is plausible to assume that the payoffs stemming from social influence are only 
part of the incentives motivating an agent to adopt a given trait (type of preferences or 
behavioural rule). Therefore, to complete the fitness function I add physical 
payoff, 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡), to the fitness function. Physical payoff stands for the tangible advantage of 
the trait under consideration. Concretely, it can be replaced by relative price or interest 
rate or the ratio of payoffs in game theoretical settings. Putting the payoffs from social 
influence together with the physical payoff, the fitness function becomes 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) =1
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) +𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−12)2 and the complete motion equation, that I term Behavioural Replicator 
Equation, becomes: 𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) +𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2   
Insert Figure 4 in here. 
            The behavioural replicator dynamics is a non-linear difference equation of second 
degree with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   is the proportion of the individuals with the trait 
under consideration at time t. The figure in the above is the graph of the equation with 
some arbitrary function for 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) and an arbitrary value for parameter 𝑔𝑔 for the sake of 
illustration6
𝜕𝜕𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓
= 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓
�
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −1/2)2   �= 𝑥𝑥(1−𝑥𝑥)(𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 3−𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 2−𝑥𝑥−𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 + 14𝑔𝑔+1)2 ≥ 0    ∀𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,1] 
.  
            A simplifying case is when f is a constant, in which case the equation will have 
two parameters (f and g). And we have: 
    𝜕𝜕𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
= 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
�
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −1/2)2   �= 𝑥𝑥 �𝑥𝑥 − 12�  (1−𝑥𝑥)(𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 3−𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 2+ 14𝑔𝑔+1)2 ≥ 0    ∀𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,1] 
                                                          
6 Plotted equation is for 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) = 710  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   and 𝑔𝑔 = 30. 
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The above differentiations show that the proportion of the individuals with the trait at the 
basis of the definition of types is an increasing function of 𝑓𝑓 (physical payoff) and, it is 
also an increasing function of 𝑔𝑔 (multiplier of organized social support). A more detailed 
analysis of the equation, enumerating its resulting dynamic patterns, is presented in the 
next section. 
III. Possible Patterns 
            I begin with formally defining the key terms I use, and then I take on the task of 
analyzing dynamic behaviour of the equation as well as the classification of its main 
patterns as a function of parameter values. 
Definition 1. Type-attribute is the feature with respect to which the population is 
heterogeneous.  
The proportion 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  denotes the agents carrying the type-attribute under consideration 
while (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )  captures the complementary proportion of the population that is 
normalized to 1. Natural selection relies on the reproduction-related advantages of a trait 
with respect to which the population is heterogeneous. In the remainder of this paper, I 
replace the term “trait” by type-attribute to focus on the decision making consequences of 
the heterogeneity in the population as it is conceived in economic theory in its most 
general and abstract way.  
Definition 2. A type-attribute is said to be fitness neutral if it does not procure an actual 
advantage or cause an actual disadvantage to the agents endowed with it or adopting it 
subsequently. The physical payoff function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) is reduced in this case to a constant 
equal unity.  
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Definition 3. A type-attribute is said to be unfit if it causes an actual disadvantage to the 
agents endowed with it or adopting it subsequently. The physical payoff function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) is 
reduced in this case to a constant smaller then unity.  
III. 1. General Behaviour and Time Trajectories 
            Finding the possible patterns without any explicit assumption about the 
function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) is impossible. But also, making assumptions about 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) without assuming 
a concrete context has little to offer to both an intuitive understanding of the equation and 
its applications, while causing important mathematical complications. I therefore focus 
on the special case where this function is a strictly positive constant denoted 𝑓𝑓. The 
behavioural replicator equation then can be written as: 
𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1
𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2     
This version of the equation has only two parameters involved: 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑔𝑔. A number of 
propositions aimed at classifying the main patterns as a function of these two parameters 
follow. 
 
Proposition 1. The behavioural replicator equation can be hill-shaped. 
Proof. See Annex 1. 
This proposition is of interest as hill-shaped recurrence equations are susceptible to 
produce complex dynamic behaviour. 
Proposition 2. For all values of 𝑔𝑔 and any initial condition the proportion of the agents 
carrying the type-attribute under consideration will not decrease unless the parameter 𝑓𝑓 is 
a constant smaller than unity. 
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Proof. See Annex 1. 
Corollary 2.1. For all values of 𝑔𝑔 and any initial condition, complex dynamic behaviour 
may emerge if and only if the type-attribute under consideration is unfit. 
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 2. For the proof of Proposition 2 see Annex 1. 
The graph below provides an illustration7
            This result is interesting, as conventional wisdom and previous formal analysis 
lead to the conclusion that if a trait is a relative disadvantage to the carrying individual or 
it benefits other agents along with the carrying individual (i.e., the trait motivates free-
riding or simply generates positive externality) the trait will become extinct over time. 
.  
Insert Figure 5 in here. 
            Proposition 2 postulates that although behavioural replicator equation can be hill-
shaped and incorporate increasing and decreasing portions, possible time trajectories of 
the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   (the proportion of the agents carrying the type-attribute under 
consideration) are quite independent from the shape of the equation, but merely relate to 
the value of a single parameter 𝑓𝑓. 
            Proposition 2 is partially intuitive as we expect that unfit type-attributes 
extinguish over time. However, it is also implied by Proposition 2 that this may not 
always be the case for unfit type-attributes, and it is certainly not the case with fitness 
neutral type-attributes. The negation of Proposition 2 is that when 𝑓𝑓 is greater or equal to 
unity the proportion of the agents carrying the type-attribute under consideration can only 
increase or remain constant. It also implies that a priori we cannot exclude the possibility 
of convergence to common consensus for any of the categories of type-attributes.  
                                                          
7 Plotted equation is for 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) = 710   and  𝑔𝑔 = 65. 
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However, there are examples of many behavioural traits that constitute disadvantages in 
this sense and yet observations show that they may reach the status of common consensus 
in human societies. Participation in wars, altruistic behaviour, engaging in social activism 
with common benefits and philanthropic activities are obvious examples.  
III. 2. Fitness Neutral Case 
            I will concentrate on fitness neutral type-attributes for they cover a large class of 
real life cases where there is no rational reason (relative advantage) underlying the 
(dominant) position of a belief, preference types or behavioural rule. It turns out that this 
class of type-attributes (𝑓𝑓 = 1) generates an intuitively appealing dynamic behaviour. 
            In contemporary human societies fitness neutrality stands behind a considerable 
subset of type-attributes (inclusive of preferences, beliefs, and behavioural rules) that we 
observe.  For example, taking the consumption choice of two perfectly substitute goods 
with equal prices: it is implausible to think this decision can affect the person's fitness. 
Also, getting a medical degree as opposed to studying finance is unlikely to affect the 
social fitness of the individual by itself in a significant way these days (while having 
medical knowledge centuries ago could possibly have had some impact on the 
individual's fitness). In any case, as soon as the value of the physical payoff (conceived as 
relative price or ratio of game theoretical payoffs or else) is equal unity the type-attribute 
is said to be fitness neutral. 
            This version of the behavioural replicator equation is then 𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 =
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −0.5)2  where  11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−0.5)2 is the overall fitness of the type-attribute under 
consideration after having replaced the parameter 𝑓𝑓 with unity. The unique parameter is 
now 𝑔𝑔, the multiplier of the social influence payoff standing as a proxy for the organized 
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social support.  Notice that if 𝑔𝑔 is equal 0 then we have  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥� ; in other words 
there will be no change as it would result from the conceptions using rational choice 
framework. I have excluded this possibility by restricting the parameter 𝑔𝑔 to real numbers 
greater than unity. 
Proposition 3. The curve resulting from the equation of a fitness neutral type-attribute 
can be hill-shaped. 
Proof. See Annex 1. 
The Proposition is a special case of Proposition 1. The graph below provides an 
illustration with an arbitrary value for the parameter 𝑔𝑔7F8.  
Insert Figure 6 in here. 
Proposition 4. For all values of 𝑔𝑔 and any initial condition, the proportion of the 
agents carrying a fitness neutral type-attribute will never decrease. 
Corollary 4.1. Period cycles or complex dynamic behaviour cannot emerge if the type-
attribute is fitness neutral. 
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 4. For the proof of Proposition 4 see Annex 1. 
Proposition 5. For a fitness neutral type-attribute there are three fixed points �0, 12 , 1�. 
The fixed points 0 and 1 are stable while and the fixed point 12  asymptotically stable. 
Corollary 5.1. All fitness neutral type-attributes will achieve a proportion at least equal 12. 
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 5. For the proof of Proposition 5 see Annex 1. 
            Proposition 5 characterises the fixed points of the equation in the fitness neutral 
case. These fixed points make intuitive sense: if a fitness neutral type-attribute emerges in 
                                                          
8 Plotted equation is for g=45 (f=1). 
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the society then it will achieve at least a proportion of ½. This conclusion corresponds to 
what one can obtain from mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if the question is specified in 
a game theoretical way. However, Proposition 5 also implies that it is also possible for 
this class of type-attributes to reach the status of common consensus (the fixed point 1). 
This conclusion is also intuitively appealing given that, evident from the proof, it is the 
initial condition that will dictate which non-zero fixed point (1/2 or 1) is to occur: if a 
fitness neutral type-attribute emerges in the society with an initial proportion greater than 
½ it only makes sense that it grows into common consensus. More interestingly, another 
possibility for a fitness neutral type-attribute to converge to common consensus is 
postulated by Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6. There is a threshold value of 𝑔𝑔 such that a minority fitness neutral type-
attribute can converge to common consensus for any initial condition satisfying 𝑥𝑥0 ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻] where 𝑥𝑥0 stands for the initial condition. 
Proof. See Annex 1.   
            The value for the multiplier of social influence payoff (the magnitude of the 
organized social support) plays a qualitative and quantitative role in how the proportion 
of the agents carrying a fitness neutral type-attribute will evolve over time.  If this 
multiplier is large enough a minority type-attribute (initial condition below 12 ) can 
converge to the fixed point 1. Simply put, even a minority fitness neutral type-attribute 
can become a common consensus if the multiplier of the organised social support is high 
enough.  
            Moreover, Proposition 6 rules out the convergence to common consensus if the 
initial conditions entail the proximity of a minority type-attribute to 12 : it becomes evident 
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from the proof of Proposition 6 that if initial conditions implies at the proximity of 𝑥𝑥0 to  12 (𝑥𝑥0 being higher than 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻  ) the type-attribute will not converge to the fixed point 1 
(common consensus). At a first glance, one may expect that only if the initial proportion 
of the agents carrying the type-attribute under consideration is very low then it may not 
converge to common consensus. But recall that the dynamics in this equation are 
determined by two forces: conformity and status-seeking. From there, it is easy to see that 
in the case where the initial proportion of the individuals carrying the type-attribute under 
consideration is close to 12  (and below it) these two forces are both almost inoperative 
(produce weak incentives). As such the proportion of the carrying agents reaches no 
farther than the smaller of the two positive fixed points i.e.,  12. 
Proposition 7. The critical interval [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻] is a strictly increasing function of the 
parameter 𝑔𝑔. 
Proof. See Annex 1.   
          This proposition establishes that the larger the parameter 𝑔𝑔 (hence the 
importance of organised social support for the type-attribute under consideration) the 
larger the set of the initial conditions for which a minority type-attribute can converge to 
common consensus. This proposition also makes intuitive sense. 
IV. Conclusion 
            This paper critically examined the use of the replicator equation in modelling 
socioeconomic dynamics. As a remedy to the pitfalls enumerated, I proposed a 
parametric fitness function incorporating the components of social influence, namely 
conformity and status-seeking, as an amendment to the original version of the equation. 
This proposition remedies the shortcomings caused by the imperfection of the analogy 
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between evolution in biological systems and social systems. The amended version of the 
equation (termed behavioural replicator equation) can be used to model the evolution of 
preferences, behavioural rules and social norms as well as information propagation. I 
derived a subset of the patterns generated by the proposed equation as a function of 
parameters, and I discussed how the predictions seem to agree with intuition and 
empirical observations.  
            The grounds for application of this equation are large: evolutionary game theory; 
evolution of preferences; evolution of beliefs and social norms. More precisely, the 
proposed equation can be used in any context the changes in the proportion of the two 
types conceived to stand for the heterogeneity in the population can be assumed affected 
by social influence. Some appropriate contexts for the behavioural replicator equation are 
where advertising and marketing efforts are being made or where social institutions 
susceptible to affect the agents’ sense of identity are present (e.g. voting and fashion 
industry). 
           Moreover, the equation can be used in the modelling of the evolution of a minority 
behavioural rule to a majority behavioural rule, in other words the passage of status-
seeking norms to conformity norms. Also, given that free-trade eliminates border 
between two usually heterogeneous populations (normally having different types or 
proportions of types in preferences, behavioural rules or beliefs) this equation can provide 
predictions about the composition of the population after free-trade.  
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ANNEX 1: Proofs 
Proposition 1. The behavioural replicator equation can be hill-shaped. 
Proof. For the sake of this proof, I need to show that the curve resulting from the 
equation 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −0.5)2  reaches a local maximum in the interval [0,1]. The 
demonstration follows. 
Differentiating the equation yields: 
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 � 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1
𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2 �=
 −2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 +4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 –2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔4 
�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3−𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +𝑔𝑔  4 +1�2    
The denominator is always positive.  
Hence, I shall consider the polynomial 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 + 4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4   (the 
numerator): 
1 − 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 + 4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 =  
−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  + 1) + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 = 
  −2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1)2 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4  
The portion (𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 )  is positive for all permissible values of 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑔𝑔. The minimum value 
attained by the polynomial −2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1)2  is −8𝑔𝑔27   and it is obtained as follows: 
min0≤𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ≤1 −2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1)2  
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𝝏𝝏�−𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −𝟏𝟏)𝟐𝟐 �
𝝏𝝏𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
= −2𝑔𝑔(3𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 4𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 1)  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�⎯⎯⎯� for 𝑔𝑔 ≠0 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡=13   𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�⎯⎯⎯� 𝛾𝛾 �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 13� = −8𝑔𝑔27   
From the above I get: 
𝝏𝝏
𝝏𝝏𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕
 � 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1
𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2 � >0  if and only if   𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 + −8𝑔𝑔27  >0 or if and only if  𝒇𝒇𝟐𝟐 > 𝟓𝟓𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏  
The inequality 𝒇𝒇
𝟐𝟐
> 𝟓𝟓
𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏
  does not hold for all permissible values of the parameters 𝑓𝑓 
and 𝑔𝑔. Therefore, the first derivative can be negative implying the possibility of 
decreasing portions for the equation following an increasing portion i.e., the equation can 
be hill-shaped QED∎  
Proposition 2. For all values of 𝑔𝑔 and any initial condition the proportion of the agents 
carrying the type-attribute under consideration will not decrease unless the parameter 𝑓𝑓 is 
a constant smaller than unity. 
Proof. I need to show that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1- 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  <0 implies𝑓𝑓 < 1: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1- 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  <0    ⇔ 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 1
𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2 - 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   <0  ⇔ 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) � 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+𝑓𝑓+𝑔𝑔4 −11+𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  −𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4  � <0 
To determine the parameter value requirements for the last inequality to hold I need to 
determine the sign of the polynomials 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1 and 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 +
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𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4    since the expression  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) is always positive. These signs are 
determined below as a function of parameters. 
(i) Sign of   1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4 : 
1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4 = 
 [1 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ] + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1� 
[1 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ] is an increasing function of 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  and always strictly positive. 
For the polynomial 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   ) = [𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1] I have: 
𝜕𝜕[𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  +𝑔𝑔4 −1] 
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 = 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  – 𝑔𝑔  
𝜕𝜕2[𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  +𝑔𝑔4 −1] 
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
2  = 2𝑔𝑔 
which implies 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   ) reaches its minimum at 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡=12.   This point is the minimum attained 
by 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  [𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1] as well. Its value is 12 [𝑔𝑔(12)2 − 𝑔𝑔 12 + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1] =−12  
It follows that 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4 +  1 +  𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  = −12 + 1 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  = 12 + 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   is 
strictly positive for all permissible values of 𝑓𝑓. 
 (ii) Sign of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1: 
𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 – 1= �𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1� + 𝑓𝑓 
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I have shown the minimum of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔4 – 1  is reached at 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡=12 . This minimum is [𝑔𝑔 �(12)2 − 𝑔𝑔 12 + 𝑔𝑔4 − 1� = −1 
Therefore it is only for 𝑓𝑓 < 1  that the polynomial 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 – 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔4 – 1 becomes 
strictly negative. It follows from (i) and (ii) that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1- 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  <0 holds only for 𝑓𝑓 < 1 QED∎ 
Proposition 3. The curve resulting from the equation of a fitness neutral type-attribute 
can be hill-shaped. 
Proof.  I need to show that the curve resulting from behavioural replicator equation for a 
fitness neutral type-attribute reaches a local maximum in the interval [0,1]. The equation 
for a fitness neutral type-attribute becomes 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2   and the proof 
follows. Differentiating the equation results in: 
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 � 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2 �=
 1−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3 +4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2 –2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  +𝑔𝑔4 
�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3−𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2+𝑔𝑔  4 +1�2   
The sign of the derivative uniquely depends on the numerator, let us call it 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  ): 
 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  ) = 1 − 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3 + 4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2 – 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  + 𝑔𝑔4  = �−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3 + 4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2 – 2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  �+�1 + 𝑔𝑔4  �= 
−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡    [𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   2 − 2𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   + 1 ]+�1 + 𝑔𝑔4  �= 
−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡    (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1)2+�1 + 𝑔𝑔4  � 
Therefore the sign of 𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) depends on 𝑔𝑔 and after doing the algebra it results in: 
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 (i) For 𝑔𝑔 ≤ 1085  it is strictly positive; 
 (ii) For 𝑔𝑔 > 1085  it is strictly positive over the interval �0, 19100� ∪ �12 , 1� and strictly 
negative otherwise;  
It follows from (i) and (ii) and given that 19100  < 12  that the curve reaches a local 
maximum in the interval �0, 12�  which is a subset of [0,1] QED∎ 
Proposition 4. For all values of 𝑔𝑔 and any initial condition, the proportion of the 
agents carrying a fitness neutral type-attribute will never decrease. 
Proof.  For this proof, I need to show that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  ≥ 0 for all 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∈[0, 1]: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1- 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2 - 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡     
=𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 −𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+14 1+𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4  =  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  −12 �21+𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 +𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4   
Given that 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 1) �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  − 12 �2is positive for all  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   I need to determine the sign of 
the polynomial 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4 . 
Sign of 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4   can be determined through the simplifications that 
follow: 
1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4  =1+�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4  �= 1+𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 14  � 
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The term �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 14  � reaches its minimum at 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡=12 and the minimum value attained 
by the expression is: 1+𝑔𝑔2 �14 − 12 + 14�=1. 
Hence 1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 3 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 2 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡4   is guaranteed to be positive for all  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   and with this, I 
have also shown that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1- 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   is always positive QED∎ 
Proposition 5. For a fitness neutral type-attribute there are three fixed points {0, 
1/2,1}; while 0 and 1 are stable fixed points 12 asymptotically stable. 
Proof. Recall that the multiplier of social influence payoff, 𝑔𝑔, is assumed to be a real 
number greater than unity. A fixed point satisfies 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  = 𝑥𝑥�; solving 
𝑥𝑥�
𝑥𝑥�+(1−𝑥𝑥�) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥�−12)2 = 𝑥𝑥 �  results in  𝑥𝑥� ∈ �0, 12 , 1� for 𝑔𝑔 ≠ 0. And I have: 
 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   � 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   +(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   ) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   −12)2 � 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   =12=� 1−2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3 +4𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2 –2𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  +
𝑔𝑔4 
�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  3−𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  2+𝑔𝑔 4 +1�2 �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  =12=1 
The slope being equal unity means the fixed point 12  is a tangency to the 45° line (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 =
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  ) implying asymptotic stability QED∎ 
Proposition 6. There is a threshold value of 𝑔𝑔 such that a minority fitness neutral type-
attribute can converge to common consensus for any initial condition satisfying 𝑥𝑥0 ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻] where 𝑥𝑥0 stands for the initial condition. 
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Proof.  Notice (i) I have from Proposition 3 that there is a local maximum in the interval 
(0, 12) ; (ii) As shown in below, the straight line 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1=12  may intersect with the curve 
𝛶𝛶(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2    up to three times in the interval �0, 12 �: 
 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 −12)2  =
12  ⇒  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ∈  � 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 − �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� , 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 + �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)�, 12 � 
Putting (i) and (ii) together I deduce that first, a local maximum is reached in the interval 
(0, 12 ); second, if the value of the local maximum in the interval (0, 12 ) is greater than  12   
then there is a non-empty interval such that it possible for 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  to  jumps over the fixed 
point  12   and to converge to the fixed point 1 or the status of common consensus (see 
Figure 6).  
           The parameter value requirement for the above is determined below. 
Solving 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 − �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� =  14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 + �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)�   𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�⎯⎯⎯� 𝑔𝑔 = 32 
Hence, for the parameter value 𝑔𝑔 = 32 the local maximum of the behavioural replicator 
equation,   𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥+(1−𝑥𝑥) 11+𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥−12)2 , is tangent to the straight line 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 12  which means: 
 (i) If 𝑔𝑔 < 32  then the entirety of the curve up the point 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  =  12  is below the straight line 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 12  therefore for the initial conditions 𝑥𝑥0∈(0,  12) the fixed  is 12. The type-attribute 
under consideration will only converge to common consensus only when 𝑥𝑥0∈( 12 , 1]. 
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 (ii) If 𝑔𝑔 = 32  then the local maximum of the curve is tangent to the straight line 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 =12; hence the fixed point will be again 12  and only the speed of convergence will differ 
from (be faster than) the case described in (i). The type-attribute under consideration will 
only converge to common consensus when 𝑥𝑥0∈ (12 , 1]. 
(iii) If 𝑔𝑔 > 32 then three distinct intersections with the straight line 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 12  exist; hence 
for initial conditions 𝑥𝑥0∈ � 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 − �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)�  ,   14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 + �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)�� ⊂ [0, 12) a 
minority type-attribute will not get trapped at the fixed point 12 but converges to common 
consensus. It also becomes evident that the points defining the critical interval for the 
initial point 𝑥𝑥0 are 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 − �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 + �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� and 
these points are making a non-empty interval [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻] since for this range of 𝑔𝑔 obviously 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 ≠ 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻   QED∎ 
Proposition 7. The critical interval [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻] is a strictly increasing function of the 
parameter 𝑔𝑔. 
Proof. Let  𝑚𝑚 stand for the  length of the critical interval [𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻].  Then I have: 
𝑚𝑚 = 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻−𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = � 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 + �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� � − � 14𝑔𝑔  �𝑔𝑔 − �𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔 − 32)� � =�𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔−32)2𝑔𝑔   
Recall that according to Proposition 6 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 and 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻   are defined only for 𝑔𝑔 > 32. 𝐴𝐴 strictly 
positive derivative for 𝑔𝑔 > 32 establishes the result. Differentiating the expression for 
𝑚𝑚 with respect to 𝑔𝑔 I get: 
𝑦𝑦�
12𝑔𝑔��𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔−32)��
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔
 = 8
𝑔𝑔�𝑔𝑔(𝑔𝑔−32)  > 0 for  all 𝑔𝑔 > 32  QED∎ 
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Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 
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Conclusion 
            This thesis explored the grounds of application of economic theory and 
methodology in the understanding of some social institutions with economic 
consequences (namely visual artists’ compensation schemes, religiosity and social 
influence). Economic methodology has been applied to both qualitative and quantitative 
examination of these institutions. 
            In my first essay (with Professor Jim Engle-Warnick), I showed using 
experimental methodology that the institution of resale royalty (droit de suite) might 
adversely affect the welfare of visual artists (painters and sculptors). This essay, 
conceived in the perspective of economic analysis of legal institutions, contributes to the 
efforts made in the adoption of economically efficient legislations. 
           My second essay filled a gap in the knowledge of stylised facts about the 
relationship between religiosity and wage as well as the factors behind the wage gap 
among religious groups in Canada. This empirical research, using Ethnic Diversity 
Survey conducted in 2004 by Statistic Canada, has not only contributed new facts about 
the relationship between religiosity and earnings but also it has updated, after 25 years, 
the strand of research on the earning gaps among religious groups in Canada: I found for 
the first time that the relationship between religiosity and wage is negative and that 
statistically significant wage gaps exist among religious groups. 
           Finally, my last essay proposed an equation that can provide qualitative and 
quantitative predictions about the evolution of types (of preferences, behavioural rules 
and beliefs) in a heterogeneous population. The results proved to be constructive in 
analytically integrating psychological and sociological insights into the field of 
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economics. The conception proposed in this paper can provide analytical frameworks for 
the study of a number of socioeconomic patterns such as the persistence of other-
regarding and altruistic behaviours in human societies as well as the passage of the norms 
of status-seeking to the norms of conformity, which could previously be only 
inadequately examined using economic methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
